Monday, March 30, 2009

Shut Down

The Beach Boys' iconic song about a drag race between a "Fuel Injected Stingray" (Chevrolet Corvette) and a "413" (Dodge Coronet) harkens back to the glory days of General Motors and Chrysler. Today, these once storied manufacturers are miss-firing badly, so badly that the government has stepped in and has grabbed hold of the wheel.

Over the weekend the government stated its requirements for further aid for GM and Chrysler. GM CEO and Chairman, Rick Wagoner has been ask to remove himself from his place of employment. That request came from the government. Chrysler, once the domestic small car leader and creator of the last profitable domestic small cars (the original Neon) has been ordered into a partnership with Italian auto giant, FIAT. FIAT left our shores in the 1980s after decades of mostly underwhelming products (X 1/9 and Spider excepted), mediocre reliability and poor dealer network. Oh how the mighty have fallen.

Initial responses from market participants were of relief that Chrysler and GM avoided bankruptcy. I would not be so quick as to dismiss bankruptcy. Part of the plan for GM is to negotiate deals with the UAW, parts suppliers and creditors (bondholders), deals which would result in these parties not receiving full payment for their obligations. The government also announced that it would guarantee Chrysler and GM warranties. This could be a dead give-away that a government sponsored, pre-packaged bankruptcy is on the way. After all, customer warranty concerns was a main argument against bankruptcy.

Since a bankruptcy, de-facto or actual, appears to be unavoidable, what does this mean for bondholders? There is no way to know how many cents on the dollar bondholders would receive in a settlement. GM senior notes were trading at prices in the high teens today. There is some speculation that creditors may receive more substantial compensation in a settlement, but little if any of that compensation is likely to come in the form of cash.

What about GMAC bonds? GMAC does not now, nor had it prior to its 51% spin-off to private equity firm, Cerberus, share cross-default provisions with GM (the same if true of Ford and Ford Motor Credit). Therefore, a GM bankruptcy filing does not include GMAC. If GMAC were to file for bankruptcy, it would have to be in a separate filing. However, if GM is to recover and survive, a functioning GMAC is necessary. GMAC not only provides dealer financing, it provides financing for dealer inventories. This is the main reason that GMAC was granted bank holding company status last December. Technically, GMAC can issue FDIC-guaranteed TLGP bonds. If GM can in fact be saved, GMAC may finally issue TLGP debt.

The government's reorganization plans will probably result in GM and Chrysler living to race another day, but I am not optimistic for their long-term profitability. Already the government is flexing its muscles with regard to product planning and business models. This reminds me of British Leyland of the 1970s. British Leyland was formed in 1968 of struggling British automobile manufacturers. In 1975, British Leyland was partly nationalized (sound familiar?). The politically-motivated British government, which knew little about the auto industry, but much about placating labor unions, ran British Leyland into the ground. The British government decided what to build and how many. This is the road the U.S. automobile industry is heading down and a bumpy road it is. I would not be a long term investor in auto-related debt. I would not go out past (she's real fine) 2009.

Saturday, March 28, 2009

Tim Geithner and the PPIP

The debate continues over how much the new Public-Private Investment Program will help in the recovery of the U.S. financial system. The pessimists insist that asset managers will only pay fire sale prices for toxic assets. The optimists insist that the result will be a mass writing-up of toxic asset values. As with most things in life, the truth is somewhere in the middle.

Thus far, the focus of mark to market has been with toxic asset-backed securities. Securities are subject to MTM accounting. Of course, some banks insists that no market exists for some securities and places them in a so-called Level-III assets bucket. This is the home of securities which are too illiquid or esoteric to properly value (or so the banks say). Some banks have substantial sums of Level-III assets. One large New York-based banked moved $80 billion of toxic assets to Level-III in November. Even considering Level-III the PPIP could (should) be helpful to banks and the capital markets. However, its effectiveness could be limited by the toxic loan portion of the plan.

Loans are not marked to market. They are usually considered as being held to maturity and are not marked. Many of these loans are not worth 100 cents on the dollar, nor will they ever be. Gains obtained by selling toxic securities at prices higher than where banks have them marked could be moderated (but not necessarily offset) by falling loan values, should the government force banks to sell their most toxic loans as some expect.

Why sell loans at depressed prices when they can be held and worked out over time? Because investors (institutions such as hedge funds and asset managers) will not fully commit to investing in banks until toxicity is acknowledged and then removed from bank balance sheets. The result could be more capital injections into banks with the most PPIP losses and, in extreme cases, a change to the corporate structure (divestitures) of some banks. I do not believe we see outright failures of large U.S. banks.

Some banks, such as PNC, could experience significant write-ups as a results of its acquisition of National City. When one bank acquires another, the assets, including loans, of the acquired bank are valued at the time of acquisition. The results is that PNC has marked down the values of NCC loans. PNC could experience price recovery on both asset-backed securities and loans. Banks such as Wells Fargo may not experience such recovery as many of the loans it acquired in the Wachovia deal were pay-option ARMs. A pay-option ARM permits the borrower to set monthly payments within a stated range. Many such loans have experienced negative amortization as borrowers have not made payments sufficient to reduce principal. Couple that with declining home values and it is apparent that the values of these loans are low. Impaired asset values is why Moody's issued a report stating that BAC and WFC could be forced to undertake a preferred to common equity exchange similar to Citi. This may be necessary in spite of the PPIP and possible changes to MTM accounting.

Many equity cheerleaders have credited potential changes to MTM accounting as the reason for the latest bear rally in the equity markets. Although this has helped, the rally began in earnest when Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced details of the PPIP. The announcement placated some of the bank vigilantes, but not all of them.

Although the stock market has experienced its sharpest recovery since 1982, the bank and finance sector of the corporate bond market has only experienced modest gains. The credit default swap market has actually worsened with the price to purchase protection rising. What could cause such a divergence of opinion? Speculation and apprehension are the most likely causes. Some market participants are apprehensive to become bullish on the banks because they are concerned that bank losses via the PPIP could be worse than expected. They are also concerned that changes to MTM could make it so banks do not have to acknowledge many of their losses on toxic assets thereby rendering the PPIP impotent. The vigilantes want the toxicity of the balance sheets. Leaving the glow-in-the-dark assets on bank balance sheets will be viewed as a negative by the credit markets. Why trust the banks' valuations of toxic assets. They are not exactly impartial parties.

Does this mean fixed income investors should avoid bonds and trust preferreds of large money center U.S. banks? Not at all. The government has taken extraordinary measures to ensure that these institutions remain solvent and out of default. If one can tolerate volatility one can obtain attractive yields on senior and subordinate debt.

Following my piece on foreign bank leverage, a reader responded with information that a certain German bank had leverage of over 50 time as of last autumn. I have heard similar stories about a number of European institutions, but have been unable to verify actual numbers. I am often asked about other shoes to drop. One large shoe could be the European banks. That may be a sector that all but speculative investors should avoid.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Do You Want To Know a Secret

Lost in all the speculation over what toxic assets may "really" be worth is how banks came to acquire such large quantities of toxicity. I am not referring to various events of default which sent distressed asset-backed securities and loans boomeranging back onto bank balance sheets, but rather how banks and investment banks acquired sufficient capital to engage the acquisition of large pools of toxic assets. I am talking about leverage.


Traditionally, commercial banks would lever up between 10 and 15 to 1. Investment banks would carry about 20 to 1 leverage. However, firms such as Bear Stearns and Lehman were said to carry leverage ratios of 30 to one or more. One research piece I read today states that European banks may be significantly levered up due to European bank leverage accounting rules. Could the European banks be the next shoes to drop? It is certainly possible.


Foreign or domestic, banks will be reluctant to sell assets at fire sale prices, not just because doing so would result in realized losses, but also because they wouldn't be able to successfully unwind leverage. After all, loans must be paid back (at least that had been the case in the past). Look for the banks to get nudged by the government to sell asset-backed securities and loans to buyers via the PPIP. If such sales result in losses, look for the government to inject yet more capital into the banks, possibly with strings attached.

Moody's added two banks to its list of banks raising concerns. Moody's downgraded the bonds and preferreds of BAC and WFC. Not only has Moody's downgraded BAC and WFC credit ratings, it hit very subordinate securities very hard. This is especially true of non-cumulative preferred stock. Moody's believes that BAC and WFC may have to take Citi-like measures to raise tangible common equity. Depending on exactly what transpires, BAC and WFC preferred shares could become very volatile. Could their be arbitrage strategies which cause prices of preferred shares to rise? Sure, but who is to say that, if such an exchange happens at all, that the exchange terms are as generous as those offered by Citi. Also remember, that if Citi has its way, the dividends on the non-cumulative preferreds will be permanently wiped out and the securities delisted. Those speculating on preferred exchanges re doing so in the purest sense of the word.

GDP data was downright ugly. With the exception of somewhat better home sales data the other day, there are few bright spots among the economic data. Right now the plan is to play defense. Names like Comcast and Viacom offer yield outside of bank and finance sectors. The best financials continue to be JPM, GS, PNC and USB. The GE Capital panic was overdone, but calmer heads are prevailing. Still good values remain among GE Cap bonds and PINEs preferreds. Callable agency bonds and Agency MBS also offer attractive values. High Yield appears to be cheap, too cheap. When something is too good to be true, it probably is. According to most high-yield experts, corporate defaults are expected to rise. Stay away for now. I will discuss the auto debacle this weekend. I need time to go over the disaster that is the rescue plan.

The government had better soon realize that the "repaired" economy will not look like the bubble-based economies of the past 20 years fueled by an ever-lower interest rate pyramid scheme. As Citi's technical analysts stated:

"While this might seem a ridiculous comment we honestly still think that people do not get the seriousness of this “economic de-leveraging” taking place."

"People still seem focused on the idea that this is just a financial de-leverage of the last 5 or 6 years of financial excess while we believe it is an economic de-leverage of the last 25 to 30 years worth of excess."

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Tunnel of Love

"I put a hand upon the lever said let it rock and let it roll
I had the one arm bandit fever there was an arrow through my heart and my soul." - Dire Straits - Tunnel of Love.


Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner is certainly pulling the handle of the slot machine that is the Private Public Investment Program. Although the plan has potential and is along the lines of what the so-called Bank Vigilantes have been demanding (the removal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets), there are some road blocks. Not surprisingly, the road blocks could come from the world of accounting.

Within the myriad of discussions of toxic assets and how they should be valued, there continues to be the misconception that banks have already marked their toxic assets to market and need only to mark assets up to their "real" values (yeah right). It turns out that the majority of toxic assets on bank balance sheets are loans. It also turns out that loans are not subject to mark to market accounting. Because many banks have not marked down their loan value much, if at all, selling loans to asset managers via the PPIP is problematic for banks. It is problematic because in many instances the result could be realized losses for banks.

Another accounting road block could come from the FASB. The FASB is supposed to decide by April 1, 2009 whether or not to modify mark to market accounting. Although many equity-oriented investors and strategists are hopeful that MTM accounting is modified or eliminated, the bond market would take a dim view of such a decision. The bond market wants the garbage taken out. If the glow-in-the-dark assets remain on bank balance sheets, value at dubious levels set by the banks (kind of like a no-documentation situation in which we are relying on the honesty of the bank to value its health and capital ratios, yeah right) the bond market will at best continue to trade banks at somewhat distressed levels or at worst send credit spreads wider putting more stress on bank borrowing costs. The bond market takes a deeper view of corporate health. It is not always correct, but fixed income strategy goes beyond tracking trends and forecasting reversions to some arbitrary mean value.

I have been an outspoken critic of a suspension of MTM accounting. An editorial in today's Wall Street Journal authored by James S. Chanos (chairman of the Coalition of Private Investment Companies and founder and president of Kynikos Associates LP) echoes my concerns. Mr. Chanos states:

"Mark-to-market (MTM) accounting is under fierce attack by bank CEOs and others who are pressing Congress to suspend, if not repeal, the rules they blame for the current financial crisis. Yet their pleas to bubble-wrap financial statements run counter to increased calls for greater financial-market transparency and ongoing efforts to restore investor trust."





"We have a sorry history of the banking industry driving statutory and regulatory changes. Now banks want accounting fixes to mask their recklessness. Meanwhile, there has been no acknowledgment of culpability in what top management in these financial institutions did -- despite warnings -- to help bring about the crisis. Theirs is a record of lax risk management, flawed models, reckless lending, and excessively leveraged investment strategies. In the worst instances, they acted with moral indifference, knowing that what they were doing was flawed, but still willing to pocket the fees and accompanying bonuses."


"MTM accounting isn't perfect, but it does provide a compass for investors to figure out what an asset would be worth in today's market if it were sold in an orderly fashion to a willing buyer. Before MTM took effect, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) produced much evidence to show that valuing financial instruments and other difficult-to-price assets by "historical" costs, or "mark to management," was folly."



"The rules now under attack are neither as significant nor as inflexible as critics charge. MTM is generally limited to investments held for trading purposes, and to certain derivatives. For many financial institutions, these investments represent a minority of their total investment portfolio. A recent study by Bloomberg columnist David Reilly of the 12 largest banks in the KBW Bank Index shows that only 29% of the $8.46 trillion in assets are at MTM prices. In General Electric's case, the portion is just 2%."



"Why is that so? Most bank assets are in loans, which are held at their original cost using amortization rules, minus a reserve that banks must set aside as a safety cushion for potential future losses."

'MTM rules also give banks a choice. MTM accounting is not required for securities held to maturity, but you need to demonstrate a "positive intent and ability" that you will do so. Further, an SEC 2008 report found that "over 90% of investments marked-to-market are valued based on observable inputs.""



I didn't highlight Mr. Chanos' article to create a kind of mutual admiration society between he and I, but to highlight the fact that the chairman of the Coalition of Private Investment Companies (A.K.A. hedge funds, which can exert much more influence over the financial markets than myself) is voting "no" on eliminating MTM accounting in the banking world. Private investment companies can move markets by causing credit spreads to widen and push share prices lower by engaging in strategies which result in much share selling. Mr. Chanos may be the chief "vigilante"



"And the big wheel keep on turning neon burning up above
and I'm just high on the world
come on and take a low ride with me girl
on the tunnel of love" - Dire Straits

Monday, March 23, 2009

Assets For Sale

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced the details of his plan to purge balance sheets of toxic assets. The program provides for the selling of legacy loans held by banks and legacy securities backed by toxic mortgages which are decaying bank balance sheets. Treasury stated that it will sell the toxic assets to up to five asset managers "with a demonstrated track record of purchasing legacy assets," but it could add more asset managers if necessary.


The question remains: What will assets managers pay for the toxic assets? The probable answer is: Not much. This could discourage banks from participating. That may be fine for the stronger banks (stronger banks generally do not have problematic exposure to toxic assets), but banks who have received multiple rounds of government assistance could have their arms twisted. This could keep the pressure on some banks. Treasury Secretary Geithner and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair agree. Secretary Geithner stated that banks could remain under "acute pressure" and Chairman Bair stated that the plan to remove toxic assets from balance sheets may be too late to save some lenders.

Banks may be forced to sell toxic assets at depressed prices and some lenders may not survive, why did the markets (mostly the stock market) respond as positively as it did today? Because the assets finally appear to be leaving the banks. As I stated previously, no one will board a ship with a breached hull, regardless of the number of pumps employed to keep the ship of float. Passengers want the holes fixed before boarding and investors want the toxic assets gone before they invest in the banks.

Why hasn't the bond market jumped on board? Because if toxic assets are sold at relatively low prices, the balance sheets of some banks may not warrant current credit ratings (never mind better ratings). Corporate bond prices are all about credit quality, real or perceived. This creates buying opportunities among the biggest and best banks. JPM, PNC and USB appear to be the best of the bunch, but opportunities can also be found with GS, MS and WFC bonds. In fact, it is unlikely that senior note holders of ANY large U.S. financial institution will be harmed in the long run. Investors looking for yield, but an added bit of safety, why not buy bonds within the TLGP period, which has been extended until December 2012. Note: I am not suggesting buying TLGP FDIC-backed bonds for retail investors. Small investors needing FDIC insurance can do better with CDs. Buy uninsured senior notes issued by large TARP banks and you should be just fine.

What about mark-to-market? The FASB vote in the issue by April 1, 2009. Some investors are hoping that mark to market will be suspended or modified for banks. They had better be careful of what they wish for. If banks are encouraged to hold onto toxic assets because they do not have to acknowledge losses, many large investors will once again avoid investing in banks. That is, if the government really gives the banks a choice of participating or not. Basically, take TARP money, sell your assets.

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Can't See The Forest For The Trees

During the past several days I have been inundated with calls and e-mails asking why CprP and CprM have not rallied in response to the price increase of C common. The most popular secondary question is: "Have the exchange terms changed?" Although the terms are preliminary (nothing is set in stone until the SEC completes its review. The review is expected to be complete sometime between the end of April and the end of June), nothing has changed. The problem lies not in a change of exchange terms, but in the price of Citi common.

In the equity-centric world of retail investing, the knee-jerk reaction is to believe the equity price is fundamentally correct and that the preferred price is incorrect. It had not dawned on a single person who contacted me that the problem lies not with the preferreds, but with the common.


The only reason CprP and CprM are trading above $2 is that there is an arbitrage to be had. Once the arbitrage is over, there will be no bid support. One may say that CprP and CprM are trading in the teens for technical reasons. After all, without the arbitrage they are non-cumulative, non-paying preferreds. The arbitrage is that if one purchases CprM and CprP in the $13.00 area and C common is better than approximately $1.80 at the time of the exchange, the arbitrage will be successful. Because of uncertainty and the cost of hedging (shorting and borrowing C common or creating synthetic shorts using options), C preferreds had been trading at roughly a 10% discount to the conversion calculation. During the past week, the disconnect has widened to over 30%.

This is for two reasons. First: The market does not believe in the $3+ C common price. Secondly: Citi shares which can be borrowed have fried up. This is creating a short squeeze. In a typical short squeeze, the share price of the stock in question will spike as shorts are covered. Once that has been accomplished, the bid support for the stock disappears. One need only look to Volkswagen's wild ride last October. The arbitrageurs, not being able to short the common and not believing in the $3+ C share price, do not bid up CprP and CprM.

I mentioned last week that the corporate bond market had not shared in the stock market's optimism because nothing had fundamentally changed. I later acknowledged that bank bond prices performed a bit better after Treasury Secretary Geithner announced his desire to rid bank balance sheets of toxic assets. With the TALF experiencing a tepid response and few positive signs in the economic data, bank bond prices have fallen once again. In fact, prices of C bonds have fallen as its share prices have rallied. Professional fixed income investors are no all that optimistic. Similarly, CprP and CprM have become provinces of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, who are the largest participants in the arbitrage. To me it appears as the problem lies on the common side. Equity prices are among the least reliable indicators in the investment world due to their potential attractiveness as speculation vehicles.


The Fed surprised the markets today and announced that it would purchase up to $300B of U.S. treasury in an attempt to lower mortgage rates. This is an example of quantitative easing. This flies in the face of yesterdays TIC flows which indicated fewer foreign purchases of U.S. securities. Although $300B is not a large number in relative terms, it demonstrates the Fed's desire to hold borrowing costs low in an attempt to jumpstart the economy. Although inflation is likely to arise down the road (probably sometime in 2010), long-term treasury yields are unlikely to respond, yet. There is no rush now to buy ETF TBT.

Sunday, March 15, 2009

It's Getting Better

The opinion that toxic assets must come off bank balance sheets is becoming more popular (remember you heard it hear first). G20 Officials agreed that steps must be taken to rid banks of their toxic assets.Canadian Finance Minister told Bloomberg News that until banks are cleansed and resume lending, other stimuli, such as lowering interest rates and cutting taxes will have little effect.

Finance officials from around the globe are beginning to realize that many bank assets are permanently impaired. Changing mark-to-market would be like putting a band aid on a bullet wound (and would also encourage bad behavior by making it easier to take risk). They also realize that investors will not board the cruise ship that is the banking system until the hulls are repaired. Pumps are not enough.


This does not mean that losses are behind the banks. I have stated many times that some banks have not marked many of their assets to market. The belief that banks have marked all their assets to "market" and will benefit when the are able or permitted to mark their assets up either do not understand nature of the toxic asset situation or have agendas.

I am not pulling the opinion that banks have not marked the majority of their assets to market. Bloomberg News' David Reilly reports: "Of the $8.46 trillion in assets held by the 12 largest banks in the KBW Bank Index, only 29 percent is marked to market prices, according to my analysis of company data."

Mr. Reilly continues: "Altering mark-to-market rules wouldn't staunch that flow of red ink. Worse, it would make investors even more distrustful of bank balance sheets."

Mr. Reilly also notes that banks are blaming mark-to-market to deflect attention from the real problem. reckless lending. Bond holders of large bank debt should be alright. Equity holders will probably take it on the chin as the losses are realized.