Thursday, February 26, 2009

A Long, Long Lonely Winter

On Tuesday 2/24/09, I stated my belief that the government will act as an economic nanny. No large firm will be forced into a painful restructuring, much less fail. Now today we hear that AIG may get a government backstop for its CDO exposure. That's right boys and girls, if AIG's CDO bets continue to sour, the government may take the hit. I warned you.

Some of my readers and contacts took that as good news. Maybe I'm old fashioned, but I don't want my tax money to pay for bad bets of others. I am not suggesting that large firms fail and take depositors or insurance customers with them, but shareholders, who are the owners, should be wiped out as a result. The wonton bailing out of corporations sends a poor message to corporations and sets a dangerous precedent. That is, if we continue to be a capitalist nation.

Besides a Trotsky-an redistribution of the wealth, President Obama's new agenda calls for an end to government subsidy to mortgage lenders. This sent the price of SLM bonds and shares tumbling. It is also bad news for Citi, which is a large student lender. The administration acknowledged that the goal is to make the government the primary student lender. I can't wait to see the lending criteria of such an arrangement. Could we see low-income borrower receive low interest rates while more creditworthy borrowers receive higher interest rates? Why not? This is the government at work. Maybe we will have government runs automakers build government-mandated vehicles with consumers purchasing with government loans. With GM having reported a $30B annual loss for 2008 and begging for billions of dollars or more aid, anything is possible.

The next time you cheer a government bailout of a company, consider the consequences. It will be a long, long lonely recession

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury

The markets, especially bank shares, preferreds and bonds, rallied following Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's testimony today. Mr. Bernanke indicated that he does not believe the banks would have to be nationalized, that they had sufficient capital. At worst, Mr. Bernanke believes that banks may have to be dealt with on an individual basis, based on the results of the Treasury's forthcoming "stress test". A stress test which Mr. Bernanke states will not be a pass / fail test, but a measure of how much more funding specific banks may need. In other words, the entire bank rescue plan is jury-rigged.

First, I do not know one credible person who believed that the entire banking system would be nationalized. The believe that only demonstrates ignorance. Even the nationalization of one large bank is a gargantuan undertaking fraught with unintended consequences. A more realistic plan would be to take large equity investments in troubled banks and force their restructuring. Although the government may take equity stakes in certain banks, it appears as though forced (and necessary) restructurings are not on the table.


No large bank will be restructured. No large bank will have to face the realized losses it incurred. The worse off a bank the more money it receives. I am wondering if it truly matters in what class of securities one invests. According to Mr. Bernanke, large banks will be rescued come hell or high water. The secret to business success in America no longer consists of creating an efficient, well-run business model. The new secret to business success is to grow large enough to where a corporation can hold the nation hostage.


President Obama said strings will indeed be attached to further bank rescues (more inconsistencies from the government. I agree with the President. Not only to I agree with the President, but I will go one better. I think shareholders (who are owners of the banks after all) should share in the losses. I say this as an owner of a fair amount of unvested shares of a large troubled bank.

Some will argue that if shareholders, common or preferred, are wiped out, investors will not come bank to those areas of the market. The aftermath of Freddie and Fannie preferreds proves this can happen. However, the result will be that investors will look at the individual business models and results of a company, not just their size or systemic importance (or in the case of the GSEs, government reassurance). Institutions seeking capital from investors will have to be transparent and efficient. If shareholders are forced to share in the pain with taxpayers now, they will be make more prudent investment decisions for years to come and force institutions to better run their operations, lest they cut themselves off from the capital markets. In other words, if institutions want investor capital, it will have to earn investor trust!


Although it appears as the government will act as an economic nanny, I still believe it makes sense to go up the capital structure, just in case the government decides to do the right thing and unwind so-called zombie banks. Just because the government may not act appropriately does not mean that we should take undo risk by counting on the government to act irresponsibly and permit banks to pay dividends, etc. out of TARP money. One of these days it is going to surprise us.

Sunday, February 22, 2009

Things are Different Today

In recent weeks I have read several reports which have been decidedly gloomy. The authors would probably concede that the pictures they are painting are not cheery, but do give some reasons for which to be hopeful. However, their reasons for having hope focus on the accommodative policies which have already been undertaken by the Fed and the future effects of government stimulus. Is it that some economists and strategists do not understand how and why the economy has declined to such a distressed state?



That is unlikely, it is more likely that economists have nothing else on which to fall back, but the hope that policies which have successfully stimulative in the past will once again be effective. That to me is disturbing. It is disturbing because the stimulative policies of the recent past focused on making borrowed capital more affordable. Such policies never solved the problem, they only masked the problem. This is akin to warding off a hangover by becoming drunk again at the onset of a headache. If one can stay drunk, one never has to experience a hangover. That is until either one runs out of alcohol or dies of alcohol poisoning. The economy has run out of alcohol.





Let’s go back to early 1980s. The economy was mired in a morass of no growth due to high taxes, inflexible labor laws and prohibitively high inflation. Then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker correctly identified high inflation pressures as the culprit for the stagnant economy. Contrary to recent Fed policy he raised interest rates to stimulate the economy. The plan was to combat inflation by making it prohibitively expensive to borrow. Mr. Volcker made it difficult to lever up. That the resulting recession was necessary as it reduced demand to the point where inflation was defeated. Once inflation was defeated, the economy began a long, steady march upward.



All was fine through remainder of the 1980s. Yes there was the 1987 market crash and a recession in the early 1990s (exacerbated by the First Gulf War), but the economy experienced steady growth with mild periodic corrections. However, after the 1980s rapid recovery from the malaise of the 1970s, the public expected strong growth all of the time. Slow growth and recessions were considered the result of failed policies and not of normal economic cycles. Thus, the Fed would lower rates aggressively to stimulate the economy. The culture of borrowing was born of affordable leverage.



To the delight of consumers, free trade policies, welfare reform and an explosion of technological advances combined to have a turbocharger affect on the economy. By late 1999 public perception that the tech bubble was the new reality. Every venture with “dot com” in its title was considered can’t-miss business idea. Actual earnings or business plans (many ventures had no business plans) were of little concern to the new dot-com investors. Newer financial advisers were also sucked in. Investors of all ages loaded up on tech.



Former Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan’s warning about “irrational exuberance” went on heeded. When he saw the economy overheating due to preposterous investor expectations he increased interest rates. That removed leverage from the economy keeping many investors on the sidelines. Companies found venture capital more difficult to obtain. Without additional venture capital, many dot-coms failed as they were never able to generate a profit. This caused the markets to take a closer look at the tech sector. What they found was a sector littered with bad businesses. As should happen in a free market economy unviable businesses were permitted to fail. Of course the public saw the bursting of the tech bubble and the following recession as a failure of policy rather than what it really was irrational behavior on the part of investors. Business (and personal) failures are normal parts of life, except when people are told that they are not.



The recession of 2001 was blamed on the new president because it made for a good sound bite. Political pundits began telling the public that they deserved a return to a “healthy” economy like they had experienced in the late 1990s. People bought into the idea that double digit growth and windfall investments were normal!



As it had done since late in the Paul Volcker era, the Fed eased to stimulate the economy, stimulation via cheap borrowing. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan became concerned that although business activity increased, job growth remained modest (the so-called jobless recovery). Modest job growth was due to productivity gains resulting from technological advances and globalization. Fewer workers were needed to produce the required goods and service for a given amount of economic growth. That answer was politically unacceptable.



The Fed began a strategy of supercharging the economy by bring the Fed Funds rate to 1.00% was, in affect, a negative interest rate as it was below the rate of inflation. Even investors who had to pay higher-than-typical interest rates were borrowing at historically low rates. Combine that with the banks’ ability to bury exotic and subprime loans into AAA-rated securities and the recipe for disaster was not only on the stove, it was coming to a boil.



We all know what happened next. We are living it right now. What many of us many not realize is that we are not experiencing a collapse of our capitalist system (take that George Soros), but a reversion to an economy based on fundamentals and prudent lending. The last to booms (bubbles) were unsustainable economic aberrations. Efforts to re-inflate the bubble via the traditional policies of easy money have proved unsuccessful. Some businesses (possibly some banks) may fail. Many homeowners will lose their homes. These are unfortunate, but necessary occurrences. The leverage binge is over. The sooner we deal with the headache and move on the better.

Friday, February 20, 2009

That Thing You Do

On 2/17/09 I wrote about the so-called "Bond Vigilantes". My belief was that market participants would beat the living daylights out of the banks, especially those considered to be the most troubled until the government does something definitive to address toxic assets (calling some of these assets is being very kind). Market participants and the Obama administration then engaged in a dangerous game of chicken. The administration had better understand that the market will not blink. It will take an institution down if it believes it to be a failed entity. Share prices of certain banks reflect this view.

The administration finally, late this afternoon, said something. Robert Gibbs, a White House spokesman stated that the administration: "continues to strongly believe that a privately held banking system is the correct way to go." Well I'm glad to hear that. Did anyone really believe that nationalization was the best way to go as a rule?

Although its is comforting to hear that the government is not ready to transform the country to a people's republic, the statement did little to satisfy the capital markets. The markets want action. They do not want mark-to-market change. They do not want positive rhetoric. They want to know what assets are on bank balance sheets, what they are expected to be worth on a long-term basis and the want to know what will be done with banks which have an over-abundance of glow in the dark assets. They want action, not talk. The market is saying DO SOMETHING! The problem is, the government does not know what to do. Buying assets at prices which reflect even long-term prospects could sink some banks. If assets could have been purchased, former Treasury Secretary Paulson would have done so last year via TARP.


As if fear of the unknown was not enough to cripple the markets, Senator Chris Dodd (Remember him? He is the guy who accepted sweetheart mortgage deals from Countrywide and, along with Congressman Barney Frank, made the suspension of FNM and FRE preferred dividends a contingent of a Treasury rescue of the GSEs) told Bloomberg News that some banks may have to be temporarily nationalized. I don't know who is dumber, Mr. Dodd or those who elected him?

I don't think Mr. Dodd is dumb because of what he said. There could be a bank which needs nationalization (government administration is more likely), but why say so during a trading day when it is the administration which makes that decision, not Mr. Dodd. Sometimes it is better that people think you a fool than to open your mouth and prove it. An unnamed source at Treasury told Bloomberg News that Secretary Geithner will announce a plan sometime next week. He next announcement had best be better than his last or he will be dealing with a financial system collapse.


The word nationalization is now in vogue. However, most people do not understand what a true nationalization entails. In true nationalization, the government seizes a an institution, manages it and guarantees its debt and counterparty obligations. This is not likely to occur. For one, it is expensive. Secondly, it creates a dangerous unintended consequence. A nationalized bank would be backed explicitly by the government. The result would be deposits guaranteed regardless of amount because the bank itself would be explicitly guaranteed. Depositors would be incentivized to withdraw their money from smaller, non-guaranteed banks (which may not be too important to fail) and move to the new nationalized bank. The possible result are bank runs and failures around the country.

More likely is some version of AIG and or the GSEs. In the case of a troubled bank, the government could converts their preferreds to common equity to increase that bank's tangible common equity (TCE) thereby diluting common shares, making them essentially worthless. The next step could be a suspension of preferred equity dividends (so much for investing along side the government). However, debt securities, including trust preferreds, could be battered, but survive. It is probably a good idea, for those who still wish to invest in troubled banks, to move up the capital structure from common or preferred equity to at least the trust preferred level. At that level, one would still participate in any business recovery, but could be more protected in a less than optimal scenario.

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

Pressure

Today I conducted a conference call with a branch office in Chicago. Following comments I made regarding where preferreds rank in the capital structure and why the markets are beating the tar out of bonds, preferreds and common shares of certain banks, I was pressured to comment on my own firm. This in spite of my stating (several times) that I cannot do so. I did not appreciate the pressure. I hope all of my readers understand that I am really not at liberty to discuss specifics regarding my own firm.

All I can say is that the markets do not believe that all of the toxicity has been addresses within certain banks. Judging by the dollar amounts mentioned by today's call participants, it appears that many advisers and clients are greatly underestimating the toxicity on bank balance sheets. From the information I have gathered, the worst offenders could have several hundred billion dollars of toxic assets on their balance sheets. Numbers approaching a trillion dollars have been mentioned for some firms, but I have no way to verify this. The Street sure doesn't like certain banks. It would be naive to think that, at this stage of the game, that the street was completely irrational.


The autos announced their "restructuring" plans. The plans amount to little more than more layoffs, requests for billions of dollars worth of more aid and warnings that bankruptcies would be the most costly option. GM and Chrysler are basically telling Congress and the Obama administration that the least change possible is best. So much for change.

The Detroit business model is broken. Corporate structures and labor agreements make lower priced vehicles money-losers. Therefore, these vehicles receive little in the way of R&D. Unfortunately for Detroit, smaller, cheaper vehicles are what are in demand. Even Chrysler, which was the domestic small car leader (Chrysler small engines were considered to be so good that BMW used a version of the Chrysler four cylinder engine is the first generation of the modern Mini), is knocking on FIAT's door for small car development. FIAT has been out of the U.S. market since the 1980s because it could not compete.

Fixed income investors beware. Just because GM does not file for a traditional bankruptcy, it is unlikely that bondholders receive 100 cents on the dollar for their bonds. Also, any compensation resulting from a government-sponsored restructuring may not be all cash. It is likely that bondholders would receive some combination of cash, new shares and, perhaps, new debt. Keep in mind that all existing Chrysler Financial and Daimler Chrysler bonds are obligations of Daimler AG.

Que Pasa, Chica?

Friday, February 13, 2009

Bank Vigilantes

Those of us who were in the business remember the term "Bond Vigilante". The Bond Vigilantes were participants in the U.S Treasury market who put the kibosh on President Bill Clinton's spending plans by pushing the yield of long dated treasuries higher. This forced the President to scale bank spending and instead attack the budget deficit. This prompted presidential adviser James Carville to state:

"I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or as a .400 baseball hitter. But now I would like to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.''

The Vigilante's, or their descendents are back, but U.S. treasuries are not their targets. It's the banks. Bond Vigilantes are now Bank Vigilantes.


James Carville was not joking when he described the power of the bond market. More than any other area of the capital markets, the fixed income arena exerts the most influence over the economy, the President, Congress and corporations. The bond market is making itself heard loud and clear that it wants toxic asset exposure by banks revealed and it wants those toxic assets of bank balance sheets or it will take its capital elsewhere. Until the Bank Vigilantes feel comfortable, banks will have to go to the government for capital. This is all very frustrating for our new President and his treasury secretary, Tim Geithner.

The government has chosen to engage in a game of chicken with the Bank Vigilantes. The new players in D.C. had best use caution when attempting to stare down the bond market because it does not blink. The man who knows this is Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. He has stated at several venues that there needs to be a mechanism to deal with an orderly dissolution of a large, systemically-important institution. Mr. Bernanke knows that the bond market (including preferred securities) will withhold investing capital in banks which it believes may not be viable. Why take the risk. Unlike some pundits, the Bank Vigilantes do not take comfort investing along side the government in the preferred market. They do not want to risk a GSE preferred share wipe out. The first bank which comes clean by clearing out its toxic assets and throws off its TARP yoke will attract capital.

If it is that simple, why don't banks just bite the bullet and pay back TARP and become more transparent? Some are. J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are said to be considering paying back their TARP preferred investments. Why don't other large institutions do the same? If one thinks about it, the answer becomes very apparent. They cannot. This is what has prevented both former treasury secretary, Hank Paulson and current treasury secretary, Hank Paulson from enacting a workable rescue. Thus far, the government has thrown money at the problem hoping to pacify the Bank Vigilantes. The Vigilantes will have none of it. One bank CEO suggested amortizing the losses over time. This may not work because the Bank Vigilantes do not want to worry about unknown, but continuing losses. They abhor the unknown. What is frightening is that the Treasury probably has a fairly good idea what these toxic assets will be worth down the road (versus their very low current market prices), but cannot purchase toxic assets, even at their so-called "hold-to-maturity" values because values are likely sufficiently low to cripple or collapse a bank.

What happens next? Unless the Bank Vigilantes have a change of heart or the government can find a way of pacifying them without forcing a bank to acknowledge losses (neither are likely) troubled banks are going to have to face the music. Hopefully Mr. Bernanke's mechanism will be in place by then.

Wednesday, February 11, 2009

I Hate Everything About You

Former Hedge Fund Manager, Andy Kessler, has published and excellent article in the Fberuary 10th edition if the Wall Street Journal explaining why the markets did nit like what Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner had to say (or what he didn't say). Here are some excerpts:

"The Treasury secretary seems stuck on keeping the banks we have in place. But we don't need zombie banks overstuffed with nonperforming loans -- ask the Japanese."


"Mr. Geithner wants to "stress test" banks to see which are worth saving. The market already has. Despite over a trillion in assets, Citigroup is worth a meager $18 billion, Bank of America only $28 billion. The market has already figured out that the banks and their accountants haven't fessed up to bad loans and that their shareholders are toast."

"Second, Mr. Geithner wants to use up to $1 trillion to back new car loans, home loans and student loans. That's noble, but incredibly market distorting. Who gets these loans? Will banks be forced to loan to those with bad credit? Who sets loan rates? Doesn't this just set up another credit squeeze when government guarantees are lifted?"


"The first iteration of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) last year was to buy these bad loans and derivatives. It didn't work. Nothing was bought when it became clear that paying face value was a taxpayer giveaway to banks, but paying market prices for this stuff would cause huge equity write-downs, wiping out banks which would be left with negative equity and effective insolvency."

"Mr. Geithner should instead use his "stress test" and nationalize the dead banks via the FDIC -- but only for a day or so."

"First, strip out all the toxic assets and put them into a holding tank inside the Treasury. Then inject $300 billion in fresh equity for both Citi and Bank of America. Create 10 billion new shares of each of the companies to replace the old ones. The book value of each share could be $30. Very quickly, a new board of directors should be created and a new management team hired. Here's the tricky part: Who owns the shares? Politics will kill a nationalized bank. So spin them out immediately."


Readers will recognize that Mr. Kessler and I are on the same page with regards to the banks and how to get out of this crisis. Readers should pay special attention to his Japan reference. With the piggy bank known as one's home empty and traditional lending standards back in force, it will be a long time before economic activity based on consumer earned income, rather than the pyramid scheme of every increasing lending via securitization, lifts the economy into some semblance of on trend growth. The next decade may very well be lost.