Today's $12 billion auction of 30-year U.S. government bonds went exceedingly well. In fact, demaind for the longest dated U.S. government debt drew the strongest interest since November 2007. The price of the long bond rose over two points as its yield fell to 4.20% late Thursday afternoon.
Who was buying long-dated treasuries? Many institutional investors, especially foreign investors including central banks. Some foreign central banks are doing what they can to manage (I didn't say manipulate) their home currencies versus the dollar. They know full well that U.S. consumers will not be spending like drunken sailors any time soon and exporting nations need to maintain or capture as much share of the shrunken market as possible. This is yet another example of the difference of opinion between the bond market and the stock market. I would bet on the bond market being correct yet again.
More data supports the idea of a slow economic recovery. Consumer credit continues to shrink, new foreclosure filings topped 300,000 yet again (357K), jobs are scarce and mortgage delinquencies are on the rise. One only needs to listen to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner to understand the challengers facing the economy. He warned that banks still have to deal with toxic assets, today's stimulus has to be paid for down the road (higher taxes) and that the recovery will be gradual. For baby boomers and gen-xers whose market knowledge only goes back as Paul Volcker or Alan Greenspan. Anything but a V-shaped recovery is a foreign concept. Sorry folks, rates cannot get cheaper and credits standards are not going back to foolishness (yet).
Mr. Geithner summed it up this way:
“Given the extent of damage done to the financial system, the loss of wealth for families and the necessary adjustments after a long period of excessive borrowing around the world, it is realistic to assume recovery will be gradual, with more than the usual ups and downs.”
He also stated:
"We are not close to being through this."
The proposed FASB rule which will require banks to place what have been until now off balance sheet loans onto bank balance sheets slated to go into effect this November. Economic discomfort lies ahead. I would especially beware regional banks.
I have been asked many questions regarding foreign bank preferreds. I would be very concerned with preferreds issued by RBS, ING and ABN. All are on life support and the plug could be pulled by year end. Why? Way too much leverage and mounting credit-related lossed.
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Johnny Mack, You Won't Be Coming Back
Morgan Stanley's board of directors told Johnny Mack he had better pack. Following a poor 2009 earnings (thus far) and policies which prevented its bond traders from taking advantage of market conditions Morgan Stanley's board has decided to take the firm in a new direction, almost 180 degrees.
Morgan Stanley's board named co-president and wealth management chief James Gorman CEO affective January 1st, 2010. Fellow co-president Walid Chammah will relinquish his title of co-president, but will retain his position of chairman of Morgan Stanley International in London. The board's the decision to go with a retail brokerage expert versus a bond guy (Mack) or an asset-backed pro (Chammah) is a major sea change.
This truly is a big shift as retail wealth management had been treated with some contempt since the "merger" with Dean Witter. It has been widely known on the street that legacy Morgan Stanley personnel had little tolerance for Dean Witter people. This had been of much concerned on the Street as Morgan Stanley's "joint venture (take over on the installment plane) with Smith Barney had been met with much skepticism due to Morgan Stanley's ill treatment of its retail investment advisers and retail staff.
Before wealth management types begin the celebration, there are a few issue with which to be concerned. First: A lack of focus on trading means a lack of revenue for the firm. It is true that trading of certain asset-backed structures did much damage to MS (and to many other firms), but it is traditional securities trading and underwriting which pays the bills more so than any other part if the investment banking business. Cut back on trading and resource and flexibility dwindle. So does product choices an pricing power for advisers and clients.
The challenges facing Mr. Gorman are daunting. He must revitalize Morgan Stanley's trading operation, improve the relationship between wealth management and the capital markets unit and integrate over approximately 13,000 Smith Barney brokers, most of whom are accustomed to service and expertise at levels currently unavailable at Morgan Stanley. He must do all of this while simultaneously keeping investors and regulators happy. Good Luck Jamie.
Morgan Stanley's board named co-president and wealth management chief James Gorman CEO affective January 1st, 2010. Fellow co-president Walid Chammah will relinquish his title of co-president, but will retain his position of chairman of Morgan Stanley International in London. The board's the decision to go with a retail brokerage expert versus a bond guy (Mack) or an asset-backed pro (Chammah) is a major sea change.
This truly is a big shift as retail wealth management had been treated with some contempt since the "merger" with Dean Witter. It has been widely known on the street that legacy Morgan Stanley personnel had little tolerance for Dean Witter people. This had been of much concerned on the Street as Morgan Stanley's "joint venture (take over on the installment plane) with Smith Barney had been met with much skepticism due to Morgan Stanley's ill treatment of its retail investment advisers and retail staff.
Before wealth management types begin the celebration, there are a few issue with which to be concerned. First: A lack of focus on trading means a lack of revenue for the firm. It is true that trading of certain asset-backed structures did much damage to MS (and to many other firms), but it is traditional securities trading and underwriting which pays the bills more so than any other part if the investment banking business. Cut back on trading and resource and flexibility dwindle. So does product choices an pricing power for advisers and clients.
The challenges facing Mr. Gorman are daunting. He must revitalize Morgan Stanley's trading operation, improve the relationship between wealth management and the capital markets unit and integrate over approximately 13,000 Smith Barney brokers, most of whom are accustomed to service and expertise at levels currently unavailable at Morgan Stanley. He must do all of this while simultaneously keeping investors and regulators happy. Good Luck Jamie.
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
The Summer's Gone
With the passing of labor day the summer has gone and market participants are wondering if the rose that is the equity markets is set to fall. There has been much debate during the past week of whether or not there will be a V-shaped recovery. Before this question can be answered, we must first agree on what will experience a V-shaped recovery, the financial markets or the economy.
Market participants, investors and economic cheerleaders tend to treat the economy and the equity markets as being one and the same, or at least as being reflective of each other. This is not the case and history supports this. If markets were always efficiently prices, by that I mean reflecting economic conditions and business prospects of companies, we would never have bubbles and corrections. Volatility would be at a minimum and investor angst would be reduced, but so would opportunities. Of all the mistakes made during the past two decades has been the effort to reduce investing to mathematical equations. Markets and market pricing is not an exact science. Human emotions, such as fear and greed, play an enormous role in the pricing of assets. Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman is of this opinion as well.
These are strange times when I am in agreement with a Keynesian such as Mr. Krugman. As my readers well know, I am no Keynesian (even Keynes wasn't a Keynesian later in life), but I must concede that Mr. Krugman made several valid points in his article published in the most recent edition of New York Times Magazine. In the article entitled "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong" Mr. Krugman states:
"During the golden years, financial economists came to believe that markets were inherently stable — indeed, that stocks and other assets were always priced just right. There was nothing in the prevailing models suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year."
Mr. Krugman is spot on. Assets can be overprices by greed and undervalued due to fear. No model can discern the truth. Only careful analyses of the facts can properly value assets.
He continues:
"As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth."
Mathematical models are only as good as the input data. Because future occurrences are not yet known, the data used is backward looking. Although mathematical models can tell us how markets and assets MAY perform under certain known conditions (providing people (remember them?) behave the same way each time), they cannot help us forecast or deal with new, never before experienced conditions, many of which were actually caused by blind adherence to the very models designed to cover all bases.
Mr. Krugman makes more valid points when he states:
"Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation."
Although I am not in favor of heavy regulation, banks and investment banks behaved much in the way critics predicted they would in a less regulated environment. Banks took on huge amounts of risk, moved the most risky off balance sheet and kept what they thought were the better assets on their balance sheets. After all, the models don't lie. They may not lie, but they are limited. It is because markets are inefficient I believe that the recent stock market rally is not indicative of a V-shaped economic recovery, but of an asymmetric V-shaped stock market recovery.
There are too many headwinds holding back the economy. Critics blame the banks' lack of lending for holding the economy back. Banks are in fact lending, but only to those who are creditworthy. The problem is that the economy is built on consumer spending which is only possible through dramatic wage increases or large quantities of leverage. Neither is poised to occur.
In fact, it is joblessness which may be precipitating another leg down for the economy. The Wall Street Journal reports that mortgage and credit card delinquencies among prime borrowers are increasing at a faster pace than among subprime borrowers. This is due to the large number of unemployed borrowers who simply cannot make their payments. This will hold back the economic recovery and bring more losses to banks and investors of some asset-backed securities.
We may yet see a V-shaped economic cycle, except that the V is inverted and we are near the peak.
Market participants, investors and economic cheerleaders tend to treat the economy and the equity markets as being one and the same, or at least as being reflective of each other. This is not the case and history supports this. If markets were always efficiently prices, by that I mean reflecting economic conditions and business prospects of companies, we would never have bubbles and corrections. Volatility would be at a minimum and investor angst would be reduced, but so would opportunities. Of all the mistakes made during the past two decades has been the effort to reduce investing to mathematical equations. Markets and market pricing is not an exact science. Human emotions, such as fear and greed, play an enormous role in the pricing of assets. Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman is of this opinion as well.
These are strange times when I am in agreement with a Keynesian such as Mr. Krugman. As my readers well know, I am no Keynesian (even Keynes wasn't a Keynesian later in life), but I must concede that Mr. Krugman made several valid points in his article published in the most recent edition of New York Times Magazine. In the article entitled "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong" Mr. Krugman states:
"During the golden years, financial economists came to believe that markets were inherently stable — indeed, that stocks and other assets were always priced just right. There was nothing in the prevailing models suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year."
Mr. Krugman is spot on. Assets can be overprices by greed and undervalued due to fear. No model can discern the truth. Only careful analyses of the facts can properly value assets.
He continues:
"As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth."
Mathematical models are only as good as the input data. Because future occurrences are not yet known, the data used is backward looking. Although mathematical models can tell us how markets and assets MAY perform under certain known conditions (providing people (remember them?) behave the same way each time), they cannot help us forecast or deal with new, never before experienced conditions, many of which were actually caused by blind adherence to the very models designed to cover all bases.
Mr. Krugman makes more valid points when he states:
"Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation."
Although I am not in favor of heavy regulation, banks and investment banks behaved much in the way critics predicted they would in a less regulated environment. Banks took on huge amounts of risk, moved the most risky off balance sheet and kept what they thought were the better assets on their balance sheets. After all, the models don't lie. They may not lie, but they are limited. It is because markets are inefficient I believe that the recent stock market rally is not indicative of a V-shaped economic recovery, but of an asymmetric V-shaped stock market recovery.
There are too many headwinds holding back the economy. Critics blame the banks' lack of lending for holding the economy back. Banks are in fact lending, but only to those who are creditworthy. The problem is that the economy is built on consumer spending which is only possible through dramatic wage increases or large quantities of leverage. Neither is poised to occur.
In fact, it is joblessness which may be precipitating another leg down for the economy. The Wall Street Journal reports that mortgage and credit card delinquencies among prime borrowers are increasing at a faster pace than among subprime borrowers. This is due to the large number of unemployed borrowers who simply cannot make their payments. This will hold back the economic recovery and bring more losses to banks and investors of some asset-backed securities.
We may yet see a V-shaped economic cycle, except that the V is inverted and we are near the peak.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Come Tumbling Down
The market bulls' and v-shaped recovery advocates' are beginning to crumble. This morning, foreign markets trended lower as the realization that corporate profits have been the result of reduced expenses and not higher revenues. The U.S. markets followed suit, in spite of economic data which was better than the street consensus.
Not only have profits not been based on revenue improvements, but some companies have reported better earnings and reduced revenues. Even a neophyte business person knows that one cannot cut their way to success. What about the consumer coming back online and spending the economy back to health? That is probably not going to happen. Consumers cannot borrow as they had in the past. This is not just because credit is tight in general, but because lending practices are more prudent. Many consumers who had credit in the past cannot get it now and should not have received it before. It appears as though stock jockeys are wishing, hoping and betting that consumers receive access to easy credit. That probably won't happen now as it will take banks a few more years before they repeat their mistakes of the past or make new creative mistakes.
Realists are even appearing more frequently on Kudlow and Co. Guests, who Larry probably scheduled as bearish foils for his own and his cohort's bullish tones, are winning the debate. Guest Doug Kass of Seabreeze Partners put forth the argument that consumer spending will be buffeted by a weaker dollar, higher interest rates and business and consumer unfriendly tax policy. He stressed that it is consumers who lead to business growth and not the other way around. Finally, someone actually acknowledging that consumers will not be able to borrow and spend our way out of this. I have mentioned previously that economic growth could be reminiscent of the post-war era. Mr. Kass is thinking along the same lines. He told Larry Kudlow that consumers could be returning to a mentality of preservation as they were post depression. I think Mr. Kass is right on.
Markets usually overshoot on the way up as well as on the way down. Mr. Kass correctly called the bottom of the U.S. equity markets in March and now he is calling a top to the market now. With business data not supporting current market levels and market participants returning from summer vacations, we could see profit taking during the next several weeks. The traditional autumn market swoon could be upon us.
Corporate bond investors should also take heed. Corporate bond spreads have tightened dramatically. Ten-year industrial bonds, such as Wal-Mart are trading inside 80 basis points to treasuries and banks such as JPM are just over 100 basis points above treasuries. These are now withing historical spread ranges for good economic environments. I do not suggest selling high-grade bonds here if they were purchased for income. However, the trades among us may want to take some money off of the table. This is especially true of preferreds shares and more so for high yield bonds. Levels appear rich considering the head winds which probably lie ahead. Preferreds and high yield bonds look rich at these levels.
Not only have profits not been based on revenue improvements, but some companies have reported better earnings and reduced revenues. Even a neophyte business person knows that one cannot cut their way to success. What about the consumer coming back online and spending the economy back to health? That is probably not going to happen. Consumers cannot borrow as they had in the past. This is not just because credit is tight in general, but because lending practices are more prudent. Many consumers who had credit in the past cannot get it now and should not have received it before. It appears as though stock jockeys are wishing, hoping and betting that consumers receive access to easy credit. That probably won't happen now as it will take banks a few more years before they repeat their mistakes of the past or make new creative mistakes.
Realists are even appearing more frequently on Kudlow and Co. Guests, who Larry probably scheduled as bearish foils for his own and his cohort's bullish tones, are winning the debate. Guest Doug Kass of Seabreeze Partners put forth the argument that consumer spending will be buffeted by a weaker dollar, higher interest rates and business and consumer unfriendly tax policy. He stressed that it is consumers who lead to business growth and not the other way around. Finally, someone actually acknowledging that consumers will not be able to borrow and spend our way out of this. I have mentioned previously that economic growth could be reminiscent of the post-war era. Mr. Kass is thinking along the same lines. He told Larry Kudlow that consumers could be returning to a mentality of preservation as they were post depression. I think Mr. Kass is right on.
Markets usually overshoot on the way up as well as on the way down. Mr. Kass correctly called the bottom of the U.S. equity markets in March and now he is calling a top to the market now. With business data not supporting current market levels and market participants returning from summer vacations, we could see profit taking during the next several weeks. The traditional autumn market swoon could be upon us.
Corporate bond investors should also take heed. Corporate bond spreads have tightened dramatically. Ten-year industrial bonds, such as Wal-Mart are trading inside 80 basis points to treasuries and banks such as JPM are just over 100 basis points above treasuries. These are now withing historical spread ranges for good economic environments. I do not suggest selling high-grade bonds here if they were purchased for income. However, the trades among us may want to take some money off of the table. This is especially true of preferreds shares and more so for high yield bonds. Levels appear rich considering the head winds which probably lie ahead. Preferreds and high yield bonds look rich at these levels.
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
B-B-B-Benny!
President Obama's decision to nominate Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke for another four year term had pundits chattering, both approvingly and disapprovingly. Those who believe that Mr. Bernanke deserves another term point to his calm under fire and his in-depth knowledge of the great depression as the reason for averting a catastrophe. Detractors point to his previous time at the Fed when he was part and parcel to then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan's policy of keeping short-term borrowing rates very low for an extended period of time as a prime cause of the housing bubble. There is some truth on both sides of the debate.
We should all be thankful that it was Ben Bernanke who was at the Fed's helm when this crisis erupted. However, he was on board with Alan Greenspan's policy. There is one factor that few pundits seem willing to discuss. That is Wall Street's responsibility in the housing crisis.
Low rates alone did not cause the crisis. Sure, lower rates spurred home buying and put home ownership within the reach of more people, but it was Wall Street "innovation" which permitted borrowers with poor or no credit history to obtain credit. It was "innovation" which permitted 100% (or more) financing and the incredibly stupid pay option ARM. Mr. Bernanke, like investors who purchased packages of these loans, assumed that banks, investment banks, credit ratings services and investors were doing their respective due diligence. That was not the case. Even if the Fed had tightened sooner, we could have had a violent correction, but probably not as violent as have seen. The criticism should be shared by the Fed, FDIC, SEC, FINRA, The Comptroller of the Currency and the GSEs. Regulations were in place, but were ignored.
In spite of all of the aforementioned dropped balls and the shell game known as the "Stress Test" the economy does so signs of improvement. Inventories are being replaced as the worst is over. Auto sales are higher, thanks to Cash for Clunkers and home sales are rising thanks to a tax credit for first time home buyers. These are all positive events. However, just as the economy turned out not to be as bad as some feared, stimulus driven growth should not be considered normal or sustainable.
Here is where Mr. Bernanke can add value. During the Great Depression, the economy did show signs of recovery only to be torpedoed by bad tax and trade policy. Maybe Mr. Bernanke can be the soothsayer warning politicians of what might happen should they choose to make the same mistakes of their 1930s predecessors. He can also set Fed policy to minimize the damage of unwise legislation.
Mr. Bernanke will have his hands full. Taxes will probably increase, a weaker dollar will weigh heavy on food and energy prices and the huge deficits could put upward pressure on interest rates. These are formidable headwinds and could moderate, but not eliminate growth. The U.S. is the most dynamic economy in the world and, in spite what the nouveau smart will have you believe, is the prime long-term driver of global economic growth.
Opportunities abound for those who understand the fixed income markets. High yield buyers have experienced significant, albeit illogical, gains this year. These investors should not become too greedy. Corporate defaults will rise as many junk-rated companies will not be able to refinance maturing debt affordably, if at all. Many regional banks are time bombs and are clearly not too big to fail.
Treasuries have a significant amount of downside price pressure due to the potential for rising rates due to continued large supply of treasuries and rising deficits. The best places in the fixed income market are agency debt on the short end of the curve and high grade corporates (especially large true banks) farther out. Investors who can tolerate time uncertainty of maturity should consider agency-issued mortgage-backed securities, especially GNMA bonds which enjoy the full faith guarantee of the U.S. government.
Any questions, please ask.
We should all be thankful that it was Ben Bernanke who was at the Fed's helm when this crisis erupted. However, he was on board with Alan Greenspan's policy. There is one factor that few pundits seem willing to discuss. That is Wall Street's responsibility in the housing crisis.
Low rates alone did not cause the crisis. Sure, lower rates spurred home buying and put home ownership within the reach of more people, but it was Wall Street "innovation" which permitted borrowers with poor or no credit history to obtain credit. It was "innovation" which permitted 100% (or more) financing and the incredibly stupid pay option ARM. Mr. Bernanke, like investors who purchased packages of these loans, assumed that banks, investment banks, credit ratings services and investors were doing their respective due diligence. That was not the case. Even if the Fed had tightened sooner, we could have had a violent correction, but probably not as violent as have seen. The criticism should be shared by the Fed, FDIC, SEC, FINRA, The Comptroller of the Currency and the GSEs. Regulations were in place, but were ignored.
In spite of all of the aforementioned dropped balls and the shell game known as the "Stress Test" the economy does so signs of improvement. Inventories are being replaced as the worst is over. Auto sales are higher, thanks to Cash for Clunkers and home sales are rising thanks to a tax credit for first time home buyers. These are all positive events. However, just as the economy turned out not to be as bad as some feared, stimulus driven growth should not be considered normal or sustainable.
Here is where Mr. Bernanke can add value. During the Great Depression, the economy did show signs of recovery only to be torpedoed by bad tax and trade policy. Maybe Mr. Bernanke can be the soothsayer warning politicians of what might happen should they choose to make the same mistakes of their 1930s predecessors. He can also set Fed policy to minimize the damage of unwise legislation.
Mr. Bernanke will have his hands full. Taxes will probably increase, a weaker dollar will weigh heavy on food and energy prices and the huge deficits could put upward pressure on interest rates. These are formidable headwinds and could moderate, but not eliminate growth. The U.S. is the most dynamic economy in the world and, in spite what the nouveau smart will have you believe, is the prime long-term driver of global economic growth.
Opportunities abound for those who understand the fixed income markets. High yield buyers have experienced significant, albeit illogical, gains this year. These investors should not become too greedy. Corporate defaults will rise as many junk-rated companies will not be able to refinance maturing debt affordably, if at all. Many regional banks are time bombs and are clearly not too big to fail.
Treasuries have a significant amount of downside price pressure due to the potential for rising rates due to continued large supply of treasuries and rising deficits. The best places in the fixed income market are agency debt on the short end of the curve and high grade corporates (especially large true banks) farther out. Investors who can tolerate time uncertainty of maturity should consider agency-issued mortgage-backed securities, especially GNMA bonds which enjoy the full faith guarantee of the U.S. government.
Any questions, please ask.
Monday, August 24, 2009
Nowhere Man Please Listen
Nowhere Man Please Listen
He's as blind as he can be,just sees what he wants to see,Nowhere Man can you see me at all? – John Lennon / Paul McCartney
Noted NYU professor of economics, Nouriel Roubini published an article in the Financial Times explaining why, in his opinion, the U.S. economic recovery will me lengthy and gradual. Immediately, the bulls and equity market cheerleaders (stock jockeys) attempted to discredit Professor Roubini. I take umbrage (on Professor Roubini’s behalf) at the attempts to discredit and, in some instances, belittle his opinion. Judging by the statements I have heard on the opposite side of Mr. Roubini’s argument, I believe that many market bulls are “Nowhere Men”, seeing just what they want to see.
If it appears as though I give more credence to Professor Roubini’s arguments than to certain CNBC pundits and their guests it is because Mr. Roubini presents well thought out arguments to state is opinion. Many on the opposite side of the spectrum (predicting a v-shaped recovery) state that the economy has to recover sharply because of government stimulus, pent up demand, leading indicators say so or (I love this one) because it always has been this way. Of the arguments for a v-shaped recovery only leading indicators make a rational case. However, when one considers inventory replacement which is currently under way, strength as reported by leading indicators could evaporate once inventories have been built up to levels in line with consumer demand.
My biggest concern is that consumer demand will be at levels which are far below to what we have become accustomed. Remember, demand we experienced during the past to recoveries was mostly due to cheap, easy to obtain credit and the resulting rising real estate values. Although credit is currently historically cheap, the demand from credit from those who qualify to obtain credit is relatively low. For a credit-fueled recovery to materialize, banks would have to once again lower their lending standards. That is not going to happen.
Why won’t the banks take the risk and open the credit gates? After all, doing so could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Banks open the credit spigot, consumers borrow, spend and create jobs and push wages higher, making everyone more credit worthy. Sounds good, right? Wrong. The truth is that banks never thought they were taking such risks before and they are not going to take such risks now.
If you have read Mr. Roubini’s article you may have noted that he stated:
“Fourth, the financial system – despite the policy support – is still severely damaged. Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared, and traditional banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and securities while still being seriously undercapitalised. “
The so-called shadow banking system (securitization) was very important for economic growth during the past two economic expansions. The ability to package loans and sell them to investors in the form of asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and various conduits permitted than banks to open the credit spigots and lend to consumers who could not repay their debts. Once it was off their balance sheets the banks were insulated from any potential credit problems, or so they thought. Some actually believed their own, often manipulated, models and began holding some of these toxic loans on their balance sheets. With no way to move newly-created subprime loans off of their balance sheets and no desire to hold onto such loans, banks are not going to give credit to those whose ability to repay is suspect. That removes a substantial amount of consumer activity (pent up demand) from the equation.
Mr. Roubini is also correct about banks being seriously undercapitalized. Even traditional bank bull, Dick Bove’ is warning that approximately 200 banks (mostly regional banks) could fail in the near future. Mr. Bove’ is correct. There is at least one large bank which was technically insolvent if not for a government backstop and the charade of solvency put forth by moving Tier-1 capital to tangible common equity, but not raising a penny more of new equity capital.
The U.S. economy will recover. There is no economy which is as dynamic and has such creative participants, but head winds created by deleveraging, a weaker dollar (resulting in higher food and energy prices) and anti-growth tax and labor policies will buffet U.S. economic growth.
He's as blind as he can be,just sees what he wants to see,Nowhere Man can you see me at all? – John Lennon / Paul McCartney
Noted NYU professor of economics, Nouriel Roubini published an article in the Financial Times explaining why, in his opinion, the U.S. economic recovery will me lengthy and gradual. Immediately, the bulls and equity market cheerleaders (stock jockeys) attempted to discredit Professor Roubini. I take umbrage (on Professor Roubini’s behalf) at the attempts to discredit and, in some instances, belittle his opinion. Judging by the statements I have heard on the opposite side of Mr. Roubini’s argument, I believe that many market bulls are “Nowhere Men”, seeing just what they want to see.
If it appears as though I give more credence to Professor Roubini’s arguments than to certain CNBC pundits and their guests it is because Mr. Roubini presents well thought out arguments to state is opinion. Many on the opposite side of the spectrum (predicting a v-shaped recovery) state that the economy has to recover sharply because of government stimulus, pent up demand, leading indicators say so or (I love this one) because it always has been this way. Of the arguments for a v-shaped recovery only leading indicators make a rational case. However, when one considers inventory replacement which is currently under way, strength as reported by leading indicators could evaporate once inventories have been built up to levels in line with consumer demand.
My biggest concern is that consumer demand will be at levels which are far below to what we have become accustomed. Remember, demand we experienced during the past to recoveries was mostly due to cheap, easy to obtain credit and the resulting rising real estate values. Although credit is currently historically cheap, the demand from credit from those who qualify to obtain credit is relatively low. For a credit-fueled recovery to materialize, banks would have to once again lower their lending standards. That is not going to happen.
Why won’t the banks take the risk and open the credit gates? After all, doing so could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Banks open the credit spigot, consumers borrow, spend and create jobs and push wages higher, making everyone more credit worthy. Sounds good, right? Wrong. The truth is that banks never thought they were taking such risks before and they are not going to take such risks now.
If you have read Mr. Roubini’s article you may have noted that he stated:
“Fourth, the financial system – despite the policy support – is still severely damaged. Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared, and traditional banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and securities while still being seriously undercapitalised. “
The so-called shadow banking system (securitization) was very important for economic growth during the past two economic expansions. The ability to package loans and sell them to investors in the form of asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and various conduits permitted than banks to open the credit spigots and lend to consumers who could not repay their debts. Once it was off their balance sheets the banks were insulated from any potential credit problems, or so they thought. Some actually believed their own, often manipulated, models and began holding some of these toxic loans on their balance sheets. With no way to move newly-created subprime loans off of their balance sheets and no desire to hold onto such loans, banks are not going to give credit to those whose ability to repay is suspect. That removes a substantial amount of consumer activity (pent up demand) from the equation.
Mr. Roubini is also correct about banks being seriously undercapitalized. Even traditional bank bull, Dick Bove’ is warning that approximately 200 banks (mostly regional banks) could fail in the near future. Mr. Bove’ is correct. There is at least one large bank which was technically insolvent if not for a government backstop and the charade of solvency put forth by moving Tier-1 capital to tangible common equity, but not raising a penny more of new equity capital.
The U.S. economy will recover. There is no economy which is as dynamic and has such creative participants, but head winds created by deleveraging, a weaker dollar (resulting in higher food and energy prices) and anti-growth tax and labor policies will buffet U.S. economic growth.
Friday, August 21, 2009
The Truth About Internotes
There is a disturbing article from Bloomberg News this morning regarding CIT Internotes. It appears as investors did not know what they were buying and investment advisers either did not know what they were selling or misrepresented the investment. From my nearly two decades of experience with medium term notes, I can state that most investors do not fully understand the structure of most medium term note structures, including Internotes can say the same for most advisers as well.
Let's review what an Internote really is.
Internote (or Ford COBRA or GMAC Smartnote):
Senior Unsecured Note: No MTN (issued via weekly programs) is secured by specific assets. They are all general obligations of the respective issuer.
Illiquid: Weekly MTNs are issued in small sizes. Typical deal sizes range from 5mm to 20mm bonds. These would be considered good trade sizes in the institutional (real) bond market, never mind deal sizes. Bids to sell are often difficult to obtain and may be lower than were a similar (and equally senior) global issue is trading.
Survivors Options: Most issuers now include minimum holding periods of six months or one year. This means the investor must own the bonds (purchased either in the primary or secondary market) for the minimum holding period. If the investor dies before the minimum holding period passes, the survivors option may not be exercised. If the bonds transfer to heirs before the survivors option is exercised, it will be exercisable upon the death of the heirs. Most trusts are ineligible to exercise survivors option. Check with the issuer before purchasing.
Internotes and other small MTNs carry the same credit risk as any other senior unsecured corporate bond. Investors and advisers should be familiar with the credit story of each issuer before purchasing any corporate bond, including MTNs with survivors options.
Let's review what an Internote really is.
Internote (or Ford COBRA or GMAC Smartnote):
Senior Unsecured Note: No MTN (issued via weekly programs) is secured by specific assets. They are all general obligations of the respective issuer.
Illiquid: Weekly MTNs are issued in small sizes. Typical deal sizes range from 5mm to 20mm bonds. These would be considered good trade sizes in the institutional (real) bond market, never mind deal sizes. Bids to sell are often difficult to obtain and may be lower than were a similar (and equally senior) global issue is trading.
Survivors Options: Most issuers now include minimum holding periods of six months or one year. This means the investor must own the bonds (purchased either in the primary or secondary market) for the minimum holding period. If the investor dies before the minimum holding period passes, the survivors option may not be exercised. If the bonds transfer to heirs before the survivors option is exercised, it will be exercisable upon the death of the heirs. Most trusts are ineligible to exercise survivors option. Check with the issuer before purchasing.
Internotes and other small MTNs carry the same credit risk as any other senior unsecured corporate bond. Investors and advisers should be familiar with the credit story of each issuer before purchasing any corporate bond, including MTNs with survivors options.
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