Memorial Day is now behind us. Before we sink into the so-called summer doldrums (I haven't had a slow summer since 1999), let's recap market news.
Money has been flowing into high yield bond funds at a brisk pace as investors believe the worst is over. The reach for yield has begun. However, it may have begun prematurely.
High yield bond (bonds rated below investment grade) defaults have been very modest. In fact, not only are they unusually low for a recession, they are in the range the approximate pace for typical economies of about 5%. This was discussed on Kudlow & Co. last week. This has some strategists questioning earlier forecasts of 10% or higher corporate defaults. Will defaults be milder than during past recessions? Maybe, maybe not. As they say: "Timing is everything".
During the economic boom of 2003 - 2006, corporate borrowing costs were at or near all-time lows as investors reached for yield and were willing to accept lower and lower rates of return for high yield risk. Investors went well beyond their stated risk tolerances to pick up every last basis point of yield.
This was a boon to companies with lower credit ratings as it drastically reduced borrowing costs. However as Guns and Roses sang: "Nothing lasts forever, but a cold November rain." Most high yield bonds have maturities between five and ten years. The result is that many bonds issued during the economic boom may not have to be replaced with new debt for another year, two or three.
This could be a problem for some lower-rated companies as treasury benchmarks are expected to rise. As it is unlikely that credit spreads revisit historically-tight levels last seen mid-decade, replacing current debt may be cost-prohibitive for some issuers. The real story may not be that corporate bond defaults are milder this time around, but that the so-called great moderation earlier this decade left corporate borrowers with relatively under stressed balance sheets for the time being, but judgement day is approaching. Corporate days of reckoning may be delayed, but they have not been eliminated. Companies that could afford to pay their debt at rates in the 6.00% to 8.00% area may not be able to afford borrowing costs which could be in the 10% to 12% area.
Speaking of junk bonds. The GM bond for equity exchange went over like a lead balloon. Some of my sources stated that not even 10% of outstanding bondholders signed up for a ride down GM's capital structure. Bankruptcy appears almost inevitable at this point. June 1st will be judgement day for GM as the company has stated that it cannot pay its convertible bond coming due on that date. The tough love of a true bankruptcy (as opposed to the pre-packaged sham foisted upon Chrysler creditors) may be just what GM needs to become long-term viable. Look for the Obama administration to try some last minute legal trickery to avoid a true restructuring (which would be detrimental for the UAW).
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Lies, Lies, We Can't Believe A Word You Say
The truth has become very elusive to both government officials and media types. Although I don't believe that Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal reporters are deliberately distorting the news (most reporters are on the short side of their careers. It is another story with columnists), they are either misinterpreting economic data and comments by market participants and government officials or they are being told what to write by their superiors.
Case in point. Today's Initial Jobless Claims report indicated that initial jobless claims fell by 12,000 jobs from a previous report of 643,000. Most media outlets reported this as good news. First, another week of over 600,000 NEW unemployment benefits claimants is not good news. Secondly, the prior week's tally of 643,000 initial jobless claims was revised upward from 637,000. The proper way to look at the Initial Jobless Claims data is to state that since last week's report of 637,000 initial jobless claims, there have been a total of 637,000 new jobless claims (631,000 this week plus 6,000 missed in last week's tally). The situation has not improved. This can be evidenced by Continuing Claims which reported that the number of people on the unemployment dole increased to 6,662,000 from a prior revised 6,587,000.
Some misinformation is more deliberate. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner offered rising long-term treasury yields as evidence that investors believe the economy is improving (he should talk to El-Erian of PIMCO and the FOMC). The reason long-term treasury rates are rising is because of the large quantities of current and future treasury debt issuance, an expected weaker dollar and the possibility that the U.S. could lose its AAA credit rating. He fails to mention that short-term treasury yields have fallen in recent weeks, a sign that investors still place a high priority on safety and liquidity.
Speaking of the news media, I was corresponding with an acquaintance of mine who happens to be a journalist at the Wall Street Journal. I asked him why the Credit Default situation with regard to GM bondholders has not been discussed in the media. He sent me a link to a brief article published last week in the Financial Times. Here is the link:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e2bf9ea-3e54-11de-9a6c-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1
FOMC
The FOMC is not convinced that the current signs of economic stabilization are long-lasting. The Fed minutes indicate that FOMC members believe that the recession may be longer lasting and deeper than originally forecast. Fed officials also believe that growth may be slower than to what we have become accustomed when the economy finally begins growing again in late 2010 or 2011.
I am not surprised by this. The U.S. economic has been on a 25-year high fueled by every lower interest rates. Cheaper and cheaper financing coupled with easier lending standards brought about by financial innovation has caused U.S. economic growth to explode. However, the economy will have to grow based on productivity gains and structural improvements. Potential anti-business policies which have become popular on Capitol Hill threaten do sink us into an economic morass similar to that of the 1970s.
I have not been a fan of former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan making comments which could be perceived as undermining the efforts of current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. There is an unwritten rule that the preceding Fed Chairman will stay out of the spotlight as to not hamper the efforts of the presiding Fed Chairman. However, Mr. Greenspan makes some astute observations in his most recent comments.
Mr. Greenspan warned that banks need to raise large amounts of capital. The former Fed Chairman told Bloomberg News: “There is still a very large unfunded capital requirement in the commercial banking system in the United States and that’s got to be funded." He continued: “Until the price of homes flattens out we still have a very serious potential mortgage crisis.”
Readers who have been with me since my former publication (with the initials M.S.) may recall that I wrote last year that there could be no lasting recovery until home prices stabilized. I also argued that if the government had let home prices drop early on, instead of taking action to prop up prices, the damage could have been much less severe as buyers would have come off the sidelines to pick up bargains while credit was still available with less onerous terms (silly things like down payments and income verification). But hey, the government knows best.
Speaking of our Washington Wonders, they (especially President Obama and his minions) are doing a good job of re-locking the credit markets and hindering troubled asset relief. Actions taken by the administration to strong arm creditors (some of which were senior and secured) to accepting less compensation than its union benefactors (whose claims on Chrysler and GM is so subordinate they are in Hell's sub-basement) are causing institutions once interested in participating in TALF and PPIP to have second thoughts. Apparently the Obama administration believes that contract law should be usurped if it runs counter to the President's interpretation of social justice. So much for being a country of laws. We have now become a country of political whims. Some private equity funds are considering not lending money to firms with union employees. Could the administration really that naive? I'll let you decide.
This Memorial Day, please remember those who gave their all so we can enjoy our burgers and beers.
Case in point. Today's Initial Jobless Claims report indicated that initial jobless claims fell by 12,000 jobs from a previous report of 643,000. Most media outlets reported this as good news. First, another week of over 600,000 NEW unemployment benefits claimants is not good news. Secondly, the prior week's tally of 643,000 initial jobless claims was revised upward from 637,000. The proper way to look at the Initial Jobless Claims data is to state that since last week's report of 637,000 initial jobless claims, there have been a total of 637,000 new jobless claims (631,000 this week plus 6,000 missed in last week's tally). The situation has not improved. This can be evidenced by Continuing Claims which reported that the number of people on the unemployment dole increased to 6,662,000 from a prior revised 6,587,000.
Some misinformation is more deliberate. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner offered rising long-term treasury yields as evidence that investors believe the economy is improving (he should talk to El-Erian of PIMCO and the FOMC). The reason long-term treasury rates are rising is because of the large quantities of current and future treasury debt issuance, an expected weaker dollar and the possibility that the U.S. could lose its AAA credit rating. He fails to mention that short-term treasury yields have fallen in recent weeks, a sign that investors still place a high priority on safety and liquidity.
Speaking of the news media, I was corresponding with an acquaintance of mine who happens to be a journalist at the Wall Street Journal. I asked him why the Credit Default situation with regard to GM bondholders has not been discussed in the media. He sent me a link to a brief article published last week in the Financial Times. Here is the link:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e2bf9ea-3e54-11de-9a6c-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1
FOMC
The FOMC is not convinced that the current signs of economic stabilization are long-lasting. The Fed minutes indicate that FOMC members believe that the recession may be longer lasting and deeper than originally forecast. Fed officials also believe that growth may be slower than to what we have become accustomed when the economy finally begins growing again in late 2010 or 2011.
I am not surprised by this. The U.S. economic has been on a 25-year high fueled by every lower interest rates. Cheaper and cheaper financing coupled with easier lending standards brought about by financial innovation has caused U.S. economic growth to explode. However, the economy will have to grow based on productivity gains and structural improvements. Potential anti-business policies which have become popular on Capitol Hill threaten do sink us into an economic morass similar to that of the 1970s.
I have not been a fan of former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan making comments which could be perceived as undermining the efforts of current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. There is an unwritten rule that the preceding Fed Chairman will stay out of the spotlight as to not hamper the efforts of the presiding Fed Chairman. However, Mr. Greenspan makes some astute observations in his most recent comments.
Mr. Greenspan warned that banks need to raise large amounts of capital. The former Fed Chairman told Bloomberg News: “There is still a very large unfunded capital requirement in the commercial banking system in the United States and that’s got to be funded." He continued: “Until the price of homes flattens out we still have a very serious potential mortgage crisis.”
Readers who have been with me since my former publication (with the initials M.S.) may recall that I wrote last year that there could be no lasting recovery until home prices stabilized. I also argued that if the government had let home prices drop early on, instead of taking action to prop up prices, the damage could have been much less severe as buyers would have come off the sidelines to pick up bargains while credit was still available with less onerous terms (silly things like down payments and income verification). But hey, the government knows best.
Speaking of our Washington Wonders, they (especially President Obama and his minions) are doing a good job of re-locking the credit markets and hindering troubled asset relief. Actions taken by the administration to strong arm creditors (some of which were senior and secured) to accepting less compensation than its union benefactors (whose claims on Chrysler and GM is so subordinate they are in Hell's sub-basement) are causing institutions once interested in participating in TALF and PPIP to have second thoughts. Apparently the Obama administration believes that contract law should be usurped if it runs counter to the President's interpretation of social justice. So much for being a country of laws. We have now become a country of political whims. Some private equity funds are considering not lending money to firms with union employees. Could the administration really that naive? I'll let you decide.
This Memorial Day, please remember those who gave their all so we can enjoy our burgers and beers.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Dead Man's Curve
Some market participants have been voicing the opinion that no securities laws were violated and it was in the best interest of the country that Chrysler secured lenders accepted a settlement of 29 cents on the dollar. These same market participants believe that a 10% ownership stake is fair compensation for GM senior bond holders. Although it is true that no laws were circumvented in the Chrysler cramdown, creditors (most of which were TARP banks) were strong-armed by the Obama Auto Task Force. The GM bondholders are determined not to be bullied and the have the weaponry to keep the wolves at bay.
In today's Wall Street Journal, Scott Sperling co-president of private equity firm THL Partners states that he believes that GM bond holders to not deserve more than 10% of GM as compensation. He correctly notes that the government's loans rank senior to outstanding senior unsecured bonds. The problem is that no one is disputing this fact. The problem lies with the governments beneficial treatment of the UAW.
What is sticking in the collective craw of GM bond investors is that the UAW, which has a VERY subordinate equity-level claim on GM assets, has been elevated above senior bondholders. The current reorganization plan give the UAW a 38% ownership stake in GM while the bondholders get a 10% stake. Where is the justice in that? The Obama administration was hoping to strong-arm GM bondholders into accepting meager compensation. The problem is that there are very few TARP-receiving investors among GM bondholders and they have a method in which they can be very handsomely compensated (in dollar terms) should GM file for bankruptcy protection.
The vast majority of GM bondholders (and all of whom are members of the defacto bondholders steering committee) are institutions. Unlike individuals, institutions are able to hedge and adept at doing so. You can bet your bottom dollar that GM bondholders have purchased protection in the credit default swaps market. If GM files for bankruptcy protection, bondholder who have purchased protection (many of whom had done at a much earlier date) will receive par (100 cents on the dollar) for their bonds. GM bondholders have nothing to lose and many have much to gain by taking GM to bankruptcy.
Some pro-UAW and pro-administration pundits have criticized the bondholders counter proposal in which bondholders would get a 58% ownership stake in GM. Pundits point out that the government has a senior claim and is entitled to the largest portion of compensation for its loans. What the pundits conveniently ignore is that the bondholders plan pays back the government in full.
The plan proposed by the bondholders would give themselves 58% of GM, the UAW 40% and the government loans would be paid in full. In "normal" times this plan would garner much consideration by the government. Typically in a bankruptcy, the government wants to be financially compensated. It does not wish to own and run a company. However, these are not normal times. The government wants to ensure that "green" cars are built and the UAW is building them. One only needs to look at the UAW receiving a 55% ownership stake in Chrysler while have a VERY subordinate claim.
My colleagues and I cannot believe that the Automotive Task Force has not considered that institutional bondholders are hedged with CDS. However, judging by the previous missteps by team Rattner, it appears as they were outmaneuvered by the pros. This is why GM executives (past and present) unloaded large quantities of GM equity. Unless a proposal is put forth in which the bond holders acquire a controlling interest in GM, bankruptcy here we come.
Tomorrow we will discuss the slow growth ahead.
In today's Wall Street Journal, Scott Sperling co-president of private equity firm THL Partners states that he believes that GM bond holders to not deserve more than 10% of GM as compensation. He correctly notes that the government's loans rank senior to outstanding senior unsecured bonds. The problem is that no one is disputing this fact. The problem lies with the governments beneficial treatment of the UAW.
What is sticking in the collective craw of GM bond investors is that the UAW, which has a VERY subordinate equity-level claim on GM assets, has been elevated above senior bondholders. The current reorganization plan give the UAW a 38% ownership stake in GM while the bondholders get a 10% stake. Where is the justice in that? The Obama administration was hoping to strong-arm GM bondholders into accepting meager compensation. The problem is that there are very few TARP-receiving investors among GM bondholders and they have a method in which they can be very handsomely compensated (in dollar terms) should GM file for bankruptcy protection.
The vast majority of GM bondholders (and all of whom are members of the defacto bondholders steering committee) are institutions. Unlike individuals, institutions are able to hedge and adept at doing so. You can bet your bottom dollar that GM bondholders have purchased protection in the credit default swaps market. If GM files for bankruptcy protection, bondholder who have purchased protection (many of whom had done at a much earlier date) will receive par (100 cents on the dollar) for their bonds. GM bondholders have nothing to lose and many have much to gain by taking GM to bankruptcy.
Some pro-UAW and pro-administration pundits have criticized the bondholders counter proposal in which bondholders would get a 58% ownership stake in GM. Pundits point out that the government has a senior claim and is entitled to the largest portion of compensation for its loans. What the pundits conveniently ignore is that the bondholders plan pays back the government in full.
The plan proposed by the bondholders would give themselves 58% of GM, the UAW 40% and the government loans would be paid in full. In "normal" times this plan would garner much consideration by the government. Typically in a bankruptcy, the government wants to be financially compensated. It does not wish to own and run a company. However, these are not normal times. The government wants to ensure that "green" cars are built and the UAW is building them. One only needs to look at the UAW receiving a 55% ownership stake in Chrysler while have a VERY subordinate claim.
My colleagues and I cannot believe that the Automotive Task Force has not considered that institutional bondholders are hedged with CDS. However, judging by the previous missteps by team Rattner, it appears as they were outmaneuvered by the pros. This is why GM executives (past and present) unloaded large quantities of GM equity. Unless a proposal is put forth in which the bond holders acquire a controlling interest in GM, bankruptcy here we come.
Tomorrow we will discuss the slow growth ahead.
Get Back To Where You Belong
Yesterday I promised to discuss the new FASB ruling. After 11/15/09 banks will be forced to move their off balance sheet vehicles onto their balance sheets. The result will be that billions of dollars of assets and liabilities will need to recognized for banks. Most of these assets are considered to be securities and, thanks to a recent, notable FASB rule change, banks will not have to mark these assets to market. However, they will need to value these securities in some fashion. The bank vigilantes will want to know the details of these newly on balance sheet structures and will be on the lookout for favorable valuations by banks. These assets were not part of bank stress tests.
Speaking of stress tests, concern is building in the markets for smaller regional and local banks. Many of these banks are exposed to commercial mortgages which have little (if any) chance of paying off in full. Although the so-called "Big 19" banks are too big to fail, their smaller brethren are not. Distressed smaller banks will continue to put a crimp in mortgage lending. The worst of the banking crisis may or may not be over, but we are not out of the woods yet.
Speaking of stress tests, concern is building in the markets for smaller regional and local banks. Many of these banks are exposed to commercial mortgages which have little (if any) chance of paying off in full. Although the so-called "Big 19" banks are too big to fail, their smaller brethren are not. Distressed smaller banks will continue to put a crimp in mortgage lending. The worst of the banking crisis may or may not be over, but we are not out of the woods yet.
Monday, May 18, 2009
Join Together With The Band
There is an old saying which says that if you can't beat them, join them. That is exactly what is happening in some areas of the capital markets. One area is the equity market where share prices have been pushed higher by mutual funds being forced to take money of the sidelines as investor dollars continue to flow into funds. The same can be said of the high yield fixed income market. Flows into high yield funds have risen during the past month. Have investors jumped in too soon?
Maybe, maybe not. Although equity prices are rallying on not much more than hope (hope that the economy has bottomed and the economy is going to rapidly recover, its dramatic selloff during the past year was exacerbated by fear (fear that the banks were collapsing and another depression was upon us). Both the optimism now and the pessimism exhibited in 2008 and early 2009 are examples of investor overreaction. Human emotions are why markets and investing can never be reduced to mathematical formulas. There is also no "reversion to the mean" (sorry equity strategists). Truthfully there is now "mean". The markets and economy are ever-changing. Each new reality is different from the one which preceded it.
Equities are not my forte'. Fixed income is my bailiwick. Take heed of my warning that many high yield bonds have rallied too far too fast. Which ones have gone too far? I wish I knew. There lies the rub. With corporate defaults still historically low, but expected to rise, there are probably more land mines ahead. As a bond guy many of my readers may not expect me to advocate bond funds (I really don't like funds or managers for fixed income investing), but since investing in high yield bonds is a speculative endeavor and is very equity-like strategically speaking, using a bond fund for high yield bond investors may be the way to go. After all, high yield bonds should be used as speculative total return instruments and not as income-generating vehicles.
The FASB passed regulations which will force banks to move off-balance-sheet assets (many of which are toxic or potentially so) onto bank balance sheets. This could put banks under renewed pressure. More on that tomorrow.
Maybe, maybe not. Although equity prices are rallying on not much more than hope (hope that the economy has bottomed and the economy is going to rapidly recover, its dramatic selloff during the past year was exacerbated by fear (fear that the banks were collapsing and another depression was upon us). Both the optimism now and the pessimism exhibited in 2008 and early 2009 are examples of investor overreaction. Human emotions are why markets and investing can never be reduced to mathematical formulas. There is also no "reversion to the mean" (sorry equity strategists). Truthfully there is now "mean". The markets and economy are ever-changing. Each new reality is different from the one which preceded it.
Equities are not my forte'. Fixed income is my bailiwick. Take heed of my warning that many high yield bonds have rallied too far too fast. Which ones have gone too far? I wish I knew. There lies the rub. With corporate defaults still historically low, but expected to rise, there are probably more land mines ahead. As a bond guy many of my readers may not expect me to advocate bond funds (I really don't like funds or managers for fixed income investing), but since investing in high yield bonds is a speculative endeavor and is very equity-like strategically speaking, using a bond fund for high yield bond investors may be the way to go. After all, high yield bonds should be used as speculative total return instruments and not as income-generating vehicles.
The FASB passed regulations which will force banks to move off-balance-sheet assets (many of which are toxic or potentially so) onto bank balance sheets. This could put banks under renewed pressure. More on that tomorrow.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Good Morning, Good Morning, Good Morning!
Today, fixed income investors received a few wake up calls. Whether they were listening is another matter.
The calls and e-mails keep pouring in asking if investors should participate in the GM exchange offer to swap their senior debt for common equity. I have my own opinions about going lower on the capital structure (don't do it), but it is a moot point with the GM exchange. It is not going to happen. To avoid bankruptcy, GM would need 90% investor participation in the exchange. No 90% and no one gets exchanged. Why won't most GM bondholders exchange their debt for equity? Because in a bankruptcy (if the rule of law still means anything in this country), GM creditors are entitled to much more than a 10% ownership stake.
I am not the only one who believes that a GM bankruptcy is likely. GM CEO Fritz Henderson also believes that a GM bankruptcy is inevitable. Since, unlike with Chrysler, most GM bondholders are not TARP banks, President Obama may not be able to pressure creditors into committing economic suicide.
Last week there was much euphoria on Wall Street because initial jobless claims fell. Well they're up again. Sorry boys and girls, real estate values continue to decline. Companies continue to pare workers. Retail sales are not stellar and could get worse as the beneficial effects of tax refunds wain. Better earnings among retailers have been mostly due to cost cutting. That an only go so far.
What about inflation? Optimists are quick to point out that deflation is only really occurring in food, energy and real estate. Today's PPI report bears that out. However, those were the only sectors experience consistent inflation during the last economic expansion.
I am not an equity strategist, but with few tools left to stimulate growth and consumer spending to levels seen during the two decades of falling rates beginning 1982 (can't make borrowing rates and standards lower), I think returns in the stock market over the next 1o years will have difficulty outperforming the current 10-year yield of 3.10%. That's no bull.
The calls and e-mails keep pouring in asking if investors should participate in the GM exchange offer to swap their senior debt for common equity. I have my own opinions about going lower on the capital structure (don't do it), but it is a moot point with the GM exchange. It is not going to happen. To avoid bankruptcy, GM would need 90% investor participation in the exchange. No 90% and no one gets exchanged. Why won't most GM bondholders exchange their debt for equity? Because in a bankruptcy (if the rule of law still means anything in this country), GM creditors are entitled to much more than a 10% ownership stake.
I am not the only one who believes that a GM bankruptcy is likely. GM CEO Fritz Henderson also believes that a GM bankruptcy is inevitable. Since, unlike with Chrysler, most GM bondholders are not TARP banks, President Obama may not be able to pressure creditors into committing economic suicide.
Last week there was much euphoria on Wall Street because initial jobless claims fell. Well they're up again. Sorry boys and girls, real estate values continue to decline. Companies continue to pare workers. Retail sales are not stellar and could get worse as the beneficial effects of tax refunds wain. Better earnings among retailers have been mostly due to cost cutting. That an only go so far.
What about inflation? Optimists are quick to point out that deflation is only really occurring in food, energy and real estate. Today's PPI report bears that out. However, those were the only sectors experience consistent inflation during the last economic expansion.
I am not an equity strategist, but with few tools left to stimulate growth and consumer spending to levels seen during the two decades of falling rates beginning 1982 (can't make borrowing rates and standards lower), I think returns in the stock market over the next 1o years will have difficulty outperforming the current 10-year yield of 3.10%. That's no bull.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
We're Not Gonna Take It
The following is my letter to Chrysler LLC:
am disappointed in the current situation in which Chrysler finds itself. I am even more disappointed in the way Chrysler creditors were treated. I am most disappointed in the elevation of the UAWs status in bankruptcy. I currently own five Chrysler vehicles. My most recent purchases are a 2007 Dakota Quad Cab and a 2007 Caliber R/T for my wife.
I will no longer purchase vehicles from Chrysler. I will not support a company which has a group of workers who helped run the company into the ground as its majority shareholder. It is a shame that Chrysler, the former U.S. small car leader, has to receive help from FIAT (a former U.S. market failure) for assistance.
Going forward I will only purchase vehicles made in the U.S. by foreign manufacturers in non-UAW plants
am disappointed in the current situation in which Chrysler finds itself. I am even more disappointed in the way Chrysler creditors were treated. I am most disappointed in the elevation of the UAWs status in bankruptcy. I currently own five Chrysler vehicles. My most recent purchases are a 2007 Dakota Quad Cab and a 2007 Caliber R/T for my wife.
I will no longer purchase vehicles from Chrysler. I will not support a company which has a group of workers who helped run the company into the ground as its majority shareholder. It is a shame that Chrysler, the former U.S. small car leader, has to receive help from FIAT (a former U.S. market failure) for assistance.
Going forward I will only purchase vehicles made in the U.S. by foreign manufacturers in non-UAW plants
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