Tuesday, May 12, 2009

Dixie

I continue to get questions as to whether or not to exchange one's GM bonds for GM common as per the offer by GM. Besides that fact that GM probably does not get the required 90% bondholder participation to get the deal off the ground, why would anyone want to own common stock of an unrestructured GM being run by and for the benefit of the UAW and the government? Sure, one may receive approximately 30 or 40 cents on the dollar (depending on the price of GM equity), but receiving GM shares instead of cash is akin to being paid with Confederate dollars.

Think I am exaggerating? GM shares fell to a 76-year low of $1.12 after six GM executives unloaded their shares. This is telling. If GM executive believe the company's shares are essentially worthless, why should anyone own GM shares?

Mother's Little Helper

Many bulls believe that the economy will rebound sharply, mirroring its decline. Why do many strategists and prognosticators, believe this? Because it has happened before. Following every recession since the Paul Volcker area, the economy has experienced a healthy rebound. Economic recoveries were only a rate cuts (or cuts) away. Things are different today.

Today, Fed policy is extremely accommodative, even for a recession. Cutting short term borrowing rates to essentially zero has had some benefit, but we can't borrow our way out of this one. Since 1982, the economy had experienced a downward trend in borrowing costs. This enabled homeowners to refinance their homes time and time again. This put money back in the pockets of consumers. It also lowered monthly expenses allowing consumers to borrow to purchase big ticket items such as large trucks and SUVs. Lower borrowing rates also enabled consumers to afford larger, more expensive homes. Lower rates also opened up home ownership to more potential buyers. The real estate boom was on.

Accommodative Fed policy has been responsible for approximately 25 years of economic growth. However, this was only possible because of the poor policy decisions of the 1960s and 1970s. Equity strategists often talk about reversion to the mean. They are famous (or infamous) for describing the so-called mean. Could the economy finally reverting to the "mean"? Truth be told, there is no mean. The U.S. economy is dynamic. There is no mean, but we are entering a new era where the economy will be based more productivity and less on leverage.

If the economy will be based on productivity instead of cheap financing (after all, cheap financing has not been able to lift the economy out of the depths of the current recession), what will that mean for stock and home prices? Both asset classes will experience gradual long-term gains, but not the booming markets to which we have become accustomed. This is your grandfather's economy, without the industrial base.

This is not a bad thing, as long as the politicians can leave things alone. Politically-motivated policies to preserve jobs which have been outdated or to preserve industries which can be conducted in areas of the world which have a comparative advantage over the U.S. could result in inflation and higher rates accompanied by slow growth (see the 1970s and the Arthur Burns Fed). However, as long as the Fed is permitted to function independently of the administration, the economy should be alright. Just don't expect consistent double digit equity returns. Also, don't expect fund mangers to out perform the market by much. Many fund managers used the magic of leverage to produce above average returns. Look for leverage to be less in vogue. As the population ages, look for more emphasis to be placed on income vehicles such as bonds.


What does this mean for financial advisers? You MUST understand the capital markets. What does this mean for investors? You MUST understand the capital markets. Both advisers and investors must resist the urge to incur excessive risk in the quest for yield. Bulls make money, bears make money, but hogs get slaughtered

Monday, May 11, 2009

The Long and Winding Road

The equity markets trended lower as market participants took some profits off the table. Prices of long-dated treasuries rose today after the Fed purchased $3.51 billion of treasury bonds with maturities ranging 2026 to 2038 in an attempt to keep mortgage rates low. The Fed's attempt to reinvigorate the economy through interest rates is today's topic of discussion.

Many strategists are calling so a so-called "V-shaped recovery". Such a cycle is marked by a rapid economic decline (as we have just experienced) followed by a rapid recovery. However, no such recovery is possible as long as economic stability, never mind growth, is due to Fed policy. Many pundits point to the three-month LIBOR rate being below 1.00%. LIBOR rates have fallen due to the Fed's short-term borrowing programs and plan to buy commercial paper. Because banks can fund their short-term needs through the Fed, interbank lending has increased. The Fed is responsible for bank confidence. Mortgage rates have fallen, but not because banks are more comfortable lending for any fundamental reasons. The Fed's large purchases of treasuries, agencies and agency MBS has pushed rated lower. The Fed's extraordinary stimuli is barely keeping us flat.

Some pundits point to the fact that, other than food, energy and home prices, there isn't much deflation. That is because that, outside of food, energy and home prices, there wasn't much inflation in the years immediately preceding the recession. Prices will may not fall if they had not risen sharply during the economic boom years. If artificially low rates can only help us find a bottom, whet gets the economy back to on trend growth?

The question should be: What will on trend growth once the Fed stimulus programs are removed (after all, they cannot go on forever)? The answer is probably a long slow climb out of the economic hole we are currently in. Stifel Nicolaus strategist Joe Battipaglia believes that an elongated and modest recovery is probably in the cards. I agree with him.

Bond prices of bank bonds have improved since the release of the stress test results last Friday. It does not seem to matter that the test was not very stringent and the Fed cut some banks considerable breaks. However, the so-called Bank Vigilantes (my name for market participants who would push bank bond and stock prices lower as long as damage from toxic assets to bank balance sheets remained undisclosed) have been appeased by the stress tests. They have been appeased to the point that banks such as BAC, MS, BBT, Wachovia and just about every large bank other than Citi has been able to raise equity capital via IPOs to satisfy stress test requirements and banks have been able to issue non-FDIC guaranteed bonds to repay TARP. Banks want to separate from the government as soon as possible. Investors have been eager to invest in banks which seem poised to cut the cord. So much for the idea of investing along side of the government. Banks and their investors want to be as far from the government as is possible.


The bulls have used some ridiculous examples to prove that the economy is returning to "normal". Not only have they pointed to the lack of deflation within core economic sectors (where inflation has been tame for almost a decade), but they are pointing to percentage gains of stock prices among troubled banks. I'm sorry, a bank's stock rising from $2 to $4 could be viewed as positive, bit if that follows a decline from $30.

Again, I am not saying that the U.S. is sinking into an economic abyss just that the recovery will be long and drawn out. Bonds will rule. Corporate bonds continue to offer the best bang for the buck, but credit spreads continue to narrow as investors take cash off the sidelines. Beware anti-growth policies from the administration and Congress.

Friday, May 8, 2009

You Only Give Me Your Funny Papers.

What you don't read in newspapers will fill volumes. This is true of the remainder of the financial media as well. Today, the Non-farm Payrolls report indicated that the economy lost 539,000 jobs. The financial media has embraced this as a sign the recession is ending. AP Economics writer Jeanine Aversa believes that this is part of the data which is "piling up" that the recession is ending. The recession may be moderating, but the Non-farm Payrolls (a lagging indicator) headline number cannot be taken at face value. For one, the data was helped by the addition of 63,000 temporary government census workers. Also, prior months reports were revised downward. The March NFP number was adjusted downward to -699K. When one digs deep into the data, the job situation has not improved much.

Admittedly, NFP is a lagging indicator. However, Jobless Claims are considered to be coincidental. Much noise was made about initial jobless claims coming in at a better-than-expected 600K. Two things to consider here. First, 6ooK newly unemployed workers is bad no matter how one slices it. Secondly, continuing claims continue to rise. With delinquencies and defaults of residential and commercial mortgages, as well as credit cards, expected to rise, the employment situation may not be quite ready to rebound.

What about the strong data coming from retailers such as Walmart? It is true that retail sales did rise in April. However, there was an unsustainable bit of stimulus last month. That stimulus came in the form of tax refunds. Consumers spent tax refunds to replace worn goods and perform typical springtime home repairs, yard work, etc. We saw a similar sales increase last June when the tax rebate checks were distributed.

How about better-than-expected stress tests? The stress tests were not that stressful. Fortunately most large banks were better capitalized than fearmongers would have us believe. However, there were some problem children. Bank of America needs to raise $33.9B of common equity to satisfy government regulators. The bank plans on doing so by issuing new common equity and converting institutional preferred shares. BAC also issued its first non-TLGP bond since before TARP. BAC like other large banks, with the exception on Citi, to get themselves out from under TARP. Also, BAC will not convert its government preferreds to common equity. BAC wants the government out of its hair and rightfully so.

Speaking of Citi. Will someone please tell CNBC's Charlie Gasparino that Citi did not need to raise "only" $5.5B. Citi had previously began a preferred exchange which would raise up to $54B of tangible common equity. This is something no other large bank has done. Get with the program Charlie.

Kudos to Citi CEO Vikram Pandit. This much-maligned executive, who had absolutely nothing to do with Citi's plight, was optimistic yet honest with employees at today's town hall meeting, according to sources. Mr. Pandit acknowledged that Citi will not focus on repaying TARP at this time. This is likely due to the fact that the government is still providing a $300 billion backstop on very troubled assets on Citi's balance sheet. Another factor is that the government will own 36% (the largest single piece) of Citi following the preferred to equity exchange. As Illinois Senator Dick Durbin pointed out in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, Citi has been on board with government mortgage relief efforts. The government may be looking to use Citi as another GSE. Citimac has a certain ring to it. Citi is on the right track, as long as the government takes a passive role.

In spite of my shooting holes in media and market bulls optimism on the economy, all is not bad in the fixed income markets. Corporate bonds in the financial sector sold off more than they should have during the panic of a few months ago. Although prices of said bonds have rebounded as credit spreads have narrowed, outstanding values abound. I mean really, 6.00% to 8.50% returns for senior bonds issued by the "Big 19" banks? Baby-boomers should be all over these bonds.

Preferred stock investors who are enjoying significant price increases due to preferred to equity exchanges should consider swapping them for corporate bonds or at least trust preferreds. This is the first time in my over two decades trading bonds that investors can pick up yield by moving up the capital structure. Make no mistake, once the preferred to equity exchange offers end, preferreds eligible for exchange will suffer significant price depreciation, However, bonds and trust preferreds should perform better as bank balance sheets are repaired. Take the profits and increase your quality. Bulls make money, bears make money, but hogs get slaughtered.

Thursday, May 7, 2009

You Spin Me Right, Right Baby Right Round

The Government released the results of stress tests conducted for the "Big 19" banks. There weren't too many surprises. Among the strongest are JPM, Goldman and USB, all of which need no new tangible common equity. Among the banks needing significant common equity raises are BAC, Wells Fargo and a large New York-based bank whose name rhymes with "iti." What you say? That bank only needs $5.5 billion? Not so fast Sparky. There is something which is left out of this story.

"Iti" bank has already put in motion a plan to convert preferred shares into common equity. Some of my readers are aware of the extent of said bank's tangible common equity raise, but some may not be as well informed. Here is the truth.

Back in February, the government told "Iti" to convert preferred shares to common. The government will match the total conversion put forth by sovereign wealth funds and shares of non-cumulative preferreds which trade in the open market, up to $27B. If "Iti" cannot reach $27$27B worth of non-cumulative preferreds exchanged, the bank is to extend the offer to enhanced trust preferred holders and, if still not enough convert, trust preferred holders. That's right boys and girls, "Iti" is already committed to raising $54B! Wait, it gets better. Add today's announced $5.5B of additional TCE need and the amount is just shy of $60B. "Iti" needs to raise almost twice as much TCE as its closest peer, BAC. Let the spin begin.

The spin should be short-lived as Street analysts should be out over the weekend lambasting the stress tests as government fluff trying to inject optimism into the markets and economy. The Fed sees bank losses possibly reaching $599B by year end if the economy worsens. In spite of the optimism pervading the street from a better than expected initial jobless claims number (never mind that there were 600,000 new claims and that continuing claims climbed again indicating that hiring is soft) and from better retail sales data (wait until the short-term stimulus from tax refund checks has passed) the economy is bottoming at best. It is bottoming because it cannot go any lower (I hope). I think we have discovered replacement. Submariners are not all that happy when their submarine comes to rest on the ocean floor. Sure, they are not sinking further, but how will they return to the surface. This is something that is troubling Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Geithner.

Treasury Secretary Geithner has said that the stress tests were stringent. Some bank CEOs have stated that the stress tests were too stringent. How ever "Iti's" own fixed income strategists are on record as saying that they view the government's stress test base case as a bullish case and its bearish case as a base case scenario.

Some banks have announced equity IPOs following the stress test results. Wells Fargo stated that it will raise $6 billion in common equity (it needs to raise at least $13.7B) and Morgan Stanley will raise $2 billion in common equity (it needs at least $1.8b). MS also announced that it will come to market with $3B of non-TLGP bonds. Banks must raise capital by way of non-government-backed corporate bonds to exit the TARP program and leave the government behind. BAC and "Iti" will be wards of the state for a bit longer.

The government released a statement regarding capital assistance for banks. The statement mentions the possible suspension of dividends, even for cumulative trust preferreds, should the government deem it necessary to do so. The government is firmly in charge. Here is the actual statement:

JOINT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM BEN S.BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION SHEILA BAIR, AND COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY JOHN C. DUGAN The Treasury Capital Assistance Program and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program May 6th, 2009 During this period of extraordinary economic uncertainty, the U.S. federal banking supervisors believe it to be important for the largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) to have a capital buffer sufficient to withstand losses and sustain lending even in a significantly more adverse economic environment than is currently anticipated. In keeping with this aim, the Federal Reserve and other federal bank supervisors have been engaged in a comprehensive capital assessment exercise--known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)--with each of the19 largest U.S. BHCs. The SCAP will be completed this week and the results released publically by the Federal Reserve Board on Thursday May 7th,2009 at 5pm EDT. In this release, supervisors will report-- under the SCAP “more adverse” scenario, for each of the 19 institutions individually and in the aggregate--their estimatesof: losses and loss rates across select categories of loans; resources available to absorb those losses; and the resulting necessary additions to capital buffers. The estimates reported by the Federal Reserve represent values for a hypothetical ‘what-if’ scenario and are not forecasts of expected losses or revenues for the firms. Any BHC needing to augment its capital buffer at the conclusion of the SCAP will have until June 8th,2009 to develop a detailed capital plan, and until November 9th,2009 to implement that capital plan. The SCAP is a complement to the Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program (CAP), which makes capital available to financial institutions as a bridge to private capital in the future. A strong, resilient financial system is necessary to facilitate a broad and sustainable economic recovery. The U.S. government reaffirms its commitment to stand firmly behind the banking system during this period of financial strain to ensure it can perform its key function of providing credit to households and businesses. Understanding the Results of Supervisory Capital Assessment Program The SCAP Focus on the Quantity and Quality of Capital Minimum capital standards for a BHC serve only as a starting point for supervisors in determining the adequacy of the BHC’s capital relative to its risk profile. In practice, supervisors expect all BHCs to have a level and composition of Tier 1 capital well in excess of the 4% regulatory minimum, and also to have common equity as the dominant element of that Tier 1 capital. Under the SCAP, supervisors evaluated the extent to which each of the 19 BHCs would need to alter either the amount or the composition (or both) of its Tier 1 capital today to be able to comfortably exceed minimum regulatory requirements at year-end 2010, even under an more adverse economic scenario. The SCAP capital buffer for each BHC is sized to achieve a Tier 1 risk-based ratio of at least 6% and a Tier 1 Common risk- based ratio of at least 4% at the end of 2010, under a more adverse macroeconomic scenario than is currently anticipated. The SCAP focuses on Tier 1 Common capital--measured by applying the same adjustments to “voting common stockholders’ equity”used to calculate Tier 1 capital--as well as overall Tier 1 capital, because both the amount and the composition of a BHC’s capital contribute to its strength. The SCAP’s emphasis on Tier1 Common capital reflects the fact that common equity is the first element of the capital structure to absorb loss and offers protection to more senior parts of the capital structure. All else equal, more Tier 1 Common capital gives a BHC greater permanent loss absorption capacity and a greater ability to conserve resources under stress by changing the amount and timing of dividends and other distributions. The Role of the SCAP Buffer By its design, the SCAP is more stringent than a solvency test.First, each BHC’s capital was rigorously evaluated against a two-year-ahead adverse scenario that is not a prediction or an expected outcome for the economy, but is instead a “what if”scenario. In addition, the buffer was sized so that each BHC will have a cushion above regulatory minimums even in the stress scenario. Thus, any need for additional capital and/or a change in composition of capital to meet the SCAP buffer is not indicative of inadequate current capitalization. Instead, the SCAP buffer builds in extra capital against the unlikely prospect that the adverse scenario materializes. The presence of this one-time buffer will give market participants, as well as the firms themselves, confidence in the capacity of the major BHCs to perform their critical role in lending, even if the economy proves weaker than expected. Once this upfront buffer is established, the normal supervisory process will continue to be used to determine whether a firm’s current capital ratios are consistent with regulatory guidance. The SCAP and the Capital Planning Process Over the next 30 days, any BHC needing to augment its capital buffer will develop a detailed capital plan to be approved by its primary supervisor, in consultation with the FDIC, and willhave six months to implement that plan. In light of thepotential for new commitments under the Capital Assistance Program or exchanges of existing CPP preferred stock, supervisors will consult with Treasury on the development and evaluation of the plans. The capital plan will consist of three main elements: • A detailed description of the specific actions to be taken to increase the level of capital and/or to enhance the quality of capital consistent with establishing the SCAP buffer. BHCs are encouraged to design capital plans that, wherever possible, actively seek to raise new capital from private sources. These plans should include actions such as: > Issuance of new private capital instruments; > Restructuring current capital instruments; > Sales of business lines, legal entities, assets or minority interests through private transactions and through sales to the PPIP; > Use of joint ventures, spin-offs, or other capital enhancing transactions; and > Conservation of internal capital generation, including continued restrictions on dividends and stock repurchases and dividend deferrals, waivers and suspensions on preferred securities including trust preferred securities, with the expectation that plans should not rely on near-term potential increases in revenues to meet the capital buffer it is expected to have. • A list of steps to address weaknesses, where appropriate, in the BHC’s internal processes for assessing capital needs and engaging in effective capital planning.• An outline of the steps the firm will take over time to repay government provided capital taken under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), Targeted Investment Program (TIP), or the CAP, and reduce reliance on guaranteed debt issued under the TLGP. In addition, as part of the 30-day planning process, firms will need to review their existing management and Board in order to assure that the leadership of the firm has sufficient expertise and ability to manage the risks presented by the current economic environment and maintain balance sheet capacity sufficient to continue prudent lending to meet the credit needs of the economy. Supervisors expect that the board of directors and the senior management of each BHC will give the design and implementation of the capital plan their full and immediate attention and strong support. Capital plans will be submitted and approved bysupervisors by June 8th, 2009. Upon approval, these capitalplans will be the basis for the BHC’s establishment of the SCAP capital buffer by November 9th, 2009. Mandatory Convertible Preferred under the CAP To ensure that the banking system has the capital it needs to provide the credit necessary to support economic growth, the Treasury is making capital available under its Capital Assistance Program as a bridge to private capital in the future.A BHC may apply for Mandatory Convertible Preferred (MCP) in an amount up to 2% of risk-weighted assets (or higher upon request). MCP can serve as a source of contingent common capital for the firm, convertible into common equity when and if needed to meet supervisory expectations regarding the amount andcomposition of capital. Treasury will consider requests toexchange outstanding preferred shares sold under the CPP or the Targeted Investment Program (TIP) for new mandatory convertiblepreferred issued under the CAP. In order to protect thetaxpayer interest, the Treasury expects that any exchange of Treasury-issued preferred stock for MCP will be accompanied or preceded by new capital raises or exchanges of private capital securities into common equity. The MCP instrument is designed to give banks the incentive to redeem or replace the government-provided capital with private capital when feasible. The term sheet for MCP is available at www.financialstability.gov. The SCAP focused on the largest financial firms to ensure that they maintain adequate capital buffers to withstand losses in an adverse economic environment. Smaller financial institutions generally maintain capital levels, especially common equity, well above regulatory capital standards. There is no intention to expand the SCAP beyond the 19 BHCs that have recently completed this exercise. The Treasury reiterates that the CAP application process remains open to these institutions under the same terms and conditions applicable to the 19 SCAP BHCs. The Treasury stands ready to review and process any applications received in an expedient manner. For those firms wishing to apply to CAP, supervisors will review those firms’ risk profiles and capital positions.In addition, supervisors will evaluate the firms’ internal capital assessment processes, including capital planning efforts that incorporate the potential impact of stressful market conditions and adverse economic outcomes. Redeeming Preferred Securities Issued under the CPP Supervisors will carefully weigh an institution’s desire to redeem outstanding CPP preferred stock against the contribution of Treasury capital to the institutions overall soundness, capital adequacy, and ability to lend, including confirming that BHCs have a comprehensive internal capital assessment process.All BHCs seeking to repay CPP will be subject to the existing supervisory procedures for approving redemption requests for capital instruments. The 19 BHCs that were subject to the SCAP process must have a post-repayment capital base at least consistent with the SCAP buffer, and must be able to demonstrate its financial strength by issuing senior unsecured debt for a term greater than five years not backed by FDIC guarantees, in amounts sufficient to demonstrate a capacity to meet funding needs independent of government guarantees.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Back In The USSR

I have received many calls and e-mails asking my opinion as to whether or not investors should participate in General Motors' offer to exchange their bonds for GM common at a ratio of 225 shares per bond. Investors considering this exchange are making two mistakes.


Mistake #1: Investors are assuming that GM common shares will be worth about what they are trading at now ($1.85 or about 41 cents on the dollar per bond). Share dilution could push GM share prices lower. The fact that, if the exchange is successful and the UAW and government combine to own approximately 90% of GM when this is over means that shareholder value and growth will not be job #1.

Mistake #2: A major mistake investors are making is believing that the exchange will occur. For a successful exchange to occur and for bankruptcy to be averted under the government's, I mean under GM's plan, 90% of bondholders have to approve of the deal. I have as much chance of passing through the sun unscathed as 90% of GM bondholders accepting a deal to give up their status as senior creditors and become equity holders in an enterprise run for the benefit of the UAW and the green lobby.

The government is already taking steps to take advantage of this. The Obama administration is poised to push ahead with its so-called "Cash for Clunkers" plan. Consumers could receive rebates of up to $4,500 to trade in their current older vehicles for new "green" vehicles produced by (drum roll please) the new GM and Chrysler. Those who think that this is a good idea should consider two things. First, where do worn out batteries used in hybrids go when they where out? Usually to land fills where their lead is absorbed into the soil. Secondly, the last time government tried to help run an auto industry and preserve union jobs was the British Leyland fiasco in the 1970s. How many 2009 Triumphs are on the road these days?

The government presented the final stress test results to the "Big 19" banks today. Information (selectively chosen) will be released to the public this Thursday. During my travels last week, many financial advisers where optimistic that the results would be positive. Boys and girls, if they were positive, Tim Geithner would have been doing his Paul Revere impersonation "ready to ride and spread the alarm through every Middlesex village and farm" (apologies to Longfellow). If the information released is surprisingly positive, the market will not believe it too be factual for the market knows that something is rotten in the state of Denmark (apologies to Shakespeare). If the news is unexpectedly dire, the market will punish certain banks.

The government set guidelines for banks to pay back TARP funds. The most critical requirement is for banks to raise capital outside the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. Thus far, JPM, GS, and Northern Trust have done so. Two large, troubled banks have not. One, in fact, issued $7 billion of TLGP bonds last week. Don't worry, the government is all to happy to have certain large banks in its back pocket. This will enable the government to use these banks to promote its social agenda (low income lending, mortgage forgiveness, etc.) Welcome to Amerika.

All is not lost in the capital markets, however. There are signs of life in the economy (the so-called green shoots). Although opportunities abound in the high grade corporate bond market for investors who can tolerate volatility, one must take the possible bottoming of the economy for what it is, a settling at the bottom of a deep ocean. The recovery is unlikely to be V shaped, but rather more like a U with the right side being severely elongated. The worst may be over, but a boom is unlikely this year. Beware cheerleader-driven asset bubbles.

Friday, May 1, 2009

Der Kommisar

If anyone still thinks that the Obama administration has any intention of rescuing companies and returning them to profitable, capitalist enterprises please stop drinking the Kool-Aid. It was bad enough that the government is using its influence on TARP-receiving banks to forward its agenda, now the administration is going to restructure the automakers, GM and Chrysler, to provide jobs to the UAW. The UAW's money to help buy the presidency was well spent as the administration is going out of its way to ensure that either the UAW or itself own majorities of both GM and Chrysler, ignoring the rights of creditors and, in the case of GM, a plan to make taxpayers whole.

Yesterday, Chrysler filed for Chapter XI protection after some of its creditors (nearly everyone which was not a TARP bank), declined to accept the governments plan which would have left them as minority equity owners in a company run by and for the benefit if the UAW. What is more outrageous is that President Obama heavily criticized (ripped) Chrysler's who were well within their rights to demand a larger portion of ownership in Chrysler.

GM is an even more outrageous situation. GM creditors are owed $27 billion. The government is owed $15.4 billion. Given this, it would be foolish, not to mention unfair, for GM creditors (who in a bankruptcy court have a senior claim and majority on owning GM) to accept the government's plan which would give GM creditors a 10% equity ownership in a company in which the UAW and the government would collectively own nearly 90%. That would be just plain foolish.

GM bondholders have offered a counter proposal. GM creditors want control over 58% of GM and give the UAW ownership in 40% (the remaining 2% would go to other outside investors). GM creditors also said that GM would be able to pay the government (taxpayer) loans back in full. The Obama administration declined the offer.

Many analysts and market pundits are of the opinion that creditors are trying for more cents in the dollar for compensation. What is really happening here is that GM creditors do not want to be owners in a company which will be run as a non-profit organization. Come on, how profitable can GM be with the government and the UAW running it as a workers collective? How appropriate for May Day. Not only would I not invest in GM, I would not do so with the money of my worst enemy.

This socialistic power grab could be beneficial to GMAC bondholders. The government has selected GMAC as the financier of choice for both GM and Chrysler. Being a TARP bank means that GMAC will make good on its debts, as long as GM and Chrysler are building vehicles and Obama or his ilk are in power. Welcome to the People's Republic of America. If the government and / or the UAW end up as majority owners in GM and Ford, I will not purchase a vehicle from either company as long as the situation persists. I encourage my readers to do the same.