Friday, May 8, 2009

You Only Give Me Your Funny Papers.

What you don't read in newspapers will fill volumes. This is true of the remainder of the financial media as well. Today, the Non-farm Payrolls report indicated that the economy lost 539,000 jobs. The financial media has embraced this as a sign the recession is ending. AP Economics writer Jeanine Aversa believes that this is part of the data which is "piling up" that the recession is ending. The recession may be moderating, but the Non-farm Payrolls (a lagging indicator) headline number cannot be taken at face value. For one, the data was helped by the addition of 63,000 temporary government census workers. Also, prior months reports were revised downward. The March NFP number was adjusted downward to -699K. When one digs deep into the data, the job situation has not improved much.

Admittedly, NFP is a lagging indicator. However, Jobless Claims are considered to be coincidental. Much noise was made about initial jobless claims coming in at a better-than-expected 600K. Two things to consider here. First, 6ooK newly unemployed workers is bad no matter how one slices it. Secondly, continuing claims continue to rise. With delinquencies and defaults of residential and commercial mortgages, as well as credit cards, expected to rise, the employment situation may not be quite ready to rebound.

What about the strong data coming from retailers such as Walmart? It is true that retail sales did rise in April. However, there was an unsustainable bit of stimulus last month. That stimulus came in the form of tax refunds. Consumers spent tax refunds to replace worn goods and perform typical springtime home repairs, yard work, etc. We saw a similar sales increase last June when the tax rebate checks were distributed.

How about better-than-expected stress tests? The stress tests were not that stressful. Fortunately most large banks were better capitalized than fearmongers would have us believe. However, there were some problem children. Bank of America needs to raise $33.9B of common equity to satisfy government regulators. The bank plans on doing so by issuing new common equity and converting institutional preferred shares. BAC also issued its first non-TLGP bond since before TARP. BAC like other large banks, with the exception on Citi, to get themselves out from under TARP. Also, BAC will not convert its government preferreds to common equity. BAC wants the government out of its hair and rightfully so.

Speaking of Citi. Will someone please tell CNBC's Charlie Gasparino that Citi did not need to raise "only" $5.5B. Citi had previously began a preferred exchange which would raise up to $54B of tangible common equity. This is something no other large bank has done. Get with the program Charlie.

Kudos to Citi CEO Vikram Pandit. This much-maligned executive, who had absolutely nothing to do with Citi's plight, was optimistic yet honest with employees at today's town hall meeting, according to sources. Mr. Pandit acknowledged that Citi will not focus on repaying TARP at this time. This is likely due to the fact that the government is still providing a $300 billion backstop on very troubled assets on Citi's balance sheet. Another factor is that the government will own 36% (the largest single piece) of Citi following the preferred to equity exchange. As Illinois Senator Dick Durbin pointed out in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, Citi has been on board with government mortgage relief efforts. The government may be looking to use Citi as another GSE. Citimac has a certain ring to it. Citi is on the right track, as long as the government takes a passive role.

In spite of my shooting holes in media and market bulls optimism on the economy, all is not bad in the fixed income markets. Corporate bonds in the financial sector sold off more than they should have during the panic of a few months ago. Although prices of said bonds have rebounded as credit spreads have narrowed, outstanding values abound. I mean really, 6.00% to 8.50% returns for senior bonds issued by the "Big 19" banks? Baby-boomers should be all over these bonds.

Preferred stock investors who are enjoying significant price increases due to preferred to equity exchanges should consider swapping them for corporate bonds or at least trust preferreds. This is the first time in my over two decades trading bonds that investors can pick up yield by moving up the capital structure. Make no mistake, once the preferred to equity exchange offers end, preferreds eligible for exchange will suffer significant price depreciation, However, bonds and trust preferreds should perform better as bank balance sheets are repaired. Take the profits and increase your quality. Bulls make money, bears make money, but hogs get slaughtered.

Thursday, May 7, 2009

You Spin Me Right, Right Baby Right Round

The Government released the results of stress tests conducted for the "Big 19" banks. There weren't too many surprises. Among the strongest are JPM, Goldman and USB, all of which need no new tangible common equity. Among the banks needing significant common equity raises are BAC, Wells Fargo and a large New York-based bank whose name rhymes with "iti." What you say? That bank only needs $5.5 billion? Not so fast Sparky. There is something which is left out of this story.

"Iti" bank has already put in motion a plan to convert preferred shares into common equity. Some of my readers are aware of the extent of said bank's tangible common equity raise, but some may not be as well informed. Here is the truth.

Back in February, the government told "Iti" to convert preferred shares to common. The government will match the total conversion put forth by sovereign wealth funds and shares of non-cumulative preferreds which trade in the open market, up to $27B. If "Iti" cannot reach $27$27B worth of non-cumulative preferreds exchanged, the bank is to extend the offer to enhanced trust preferred holders and, if still not enough convert, trust preferred holders. That's right boys and girls, "Iti" is already committed to raising $54B! Wait, it gets better. Add today's announced $5.5B of additional TCE need and the amount is just shy of $60B. "Iti" needs to raise almost twice as much TCE as its closest peer, BAC. Let the spin begin.

The spin should be short-lived as Street analysts should be out over the weekend lambasting the stress tests as government fluff trying to inject optimism into the markets and economy. The Fed sees bank losses possibly reaching $599B by year end if the economy worsens. In spite of the optimism pervading the street from a better than expected initial jobless claims number (never mind that there were 600,000 new claims and that continuing claims climbed again indicating that hiring is soft) and from better retail sales data (wait until the short-term stimulus from tax refund checks has passed) the economy is bottoming at best. It is bottoming because it cannot go any lower (I hope). I think we have discovered replacement. Submariners are not all that happy when their submarine comes to rest on the ocean floor. Sure, they are not sinking further, but how will they return to the surface. This is something that is troubling Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Geithner.

Treasury Secretary Geithner has said that the stress tests were stringent. Some bank CEOs have stated that the stress tests were too stringent. How ever "Iti's" own fixed income strategists are on record as saying that they view the government's stress test base case as a bullish case and its bearish case as a base case scenario.

Some banks have announced equity IPOs following the stress test results. Wells Fargo stated that it will raise $6 billion in common equity (it needs to raise at least $13.7B) and Morgan Stanley will raise $2 billion in common equity (it needs at least $1.8b). MS also announced that it will come to market with $3B of non-TLGP bonds. Banks must raise capital by way of non-government-backed corporate bonds to exit the TARP program and leave the government behind. BAC and "Iti" will be wards of the state for a bit longer.

The government released a statement regarding capital assistance for banks. The statement mentions the possible suspension of dividends, even for cumulative trust preferreds, should the government deem it necessary to do so. The government is firmly in charge. Here is the actual statement:

JOINT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM BEN S.BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION SHEILA BAIR, AND COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY JOHN C. DUGAN The Treasury Capital Assistance Program and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program May 6th, 2009 During this period of extraordinary economic uncertainty, the U.S. federal banking supervisors believe it to be important for the largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) to have a capital buffer sufficient to withstand losses and sustain lending even in a significantly more adverse economic environment than is currently anticipated. In keeping with this aim, the Federal Reserve and other federal bank supervisors have been engaged in a comprehensive capital assessment exercise--known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)--with each of the19 largest U.S. BHCs. The SCAP will be completed this week and the results released publically by the Federal Reserve Board on Thursday May 7th,2009 at 5pm EDT. In this release, supervisors will report-- under the SCAP “more adverse” scenario, for each of the 19 institutions individually and in the aggregate--their estimatesof: losses and loss rates across select categories of loans; resources available to absorb those losses; and the resulting necessary additions to capital buffers. The estimates reported by the Federal Reserve represent values for a hypothetical ‘what-if’ scenario and are not forecasts of expected losses or revenues for the firms. Any BHC needing to augment its capital buffer at the conclusion of the SCAP will have until June 8th,2009 to develop a detailed capital plan, and until November 9th,2009 to implement that capital plan. The SCAP is a complement to the Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program (CAP), which makes capital available to financial institutions as a bridge to private capital in the future. A strong, resilient financial system is necessary to facilitate a broad and sustainable economic recovery. The U.S. government reaffirms its commitment to stand firmly behind the banking system during this period of financial strain to ensure it can perform its key function of providing credit to households and businesses. Understanding the Results of Supervisory Capital Assessment Program The SCAP Focus on the Quantity and Quality of Capital Minimum capital standards for a BHC serve only as a starting point for supervisors in determining the adequacy of the BHC’s capital relative to its risk profile. In practice, supervisors expect all BHCs to have a level and composition of Tier 1 capital well in excess of the 4% regulatory minimum, and also to have common equity as the dominant element of that Tier 1 capital. Under the SCAP, supervisors evaluated the extent to which each of the 19 BHCs would need to alter either the amount or the composition (or both) of its Tier 1 capital today to be able to comfortably exceed minimum regulatory requirements at year-end 2010, even under an more adverse economic scenario. The SCAP capital buffer for each BHC is sized to achieve a Tier 1 risk-based ratio of at least 6% and a Tier 1 Common risk- based ratio of at least 4% at the end of 2010, under a more adverse macroeconomic scenario than is currently anticipated. The SCAP focuses on Tier 1 Common capital--measured by applying the same adjustments to “voting common stockholders’ equity”used to calculate Tier 1 capital--as well as overall Tier 1 capital, because both the amount and the composition of a BHC’s capital contribute to its strength. The SCAP’s emphasis on Tier1 Common capital reflects the fact that common equity is the first element of the capital structure to absorb loss and offers protection to more senior parts of the capital structure. All else equal, more Tier 1 Common capital gives a BHC greater permanent loss absorption capacity and a greater ability to conserve resources under stress by changing the amount and timing of dividends and other distributions. The Role of the SCAP Buffer By its design, the SCAP is more stringent than a solvency test.First, each BHC’s capital was rigorously evaluated against a two-year-ahead adverse scenario that is not a prediction or an expected outcome for the economy, but is instead a “what if”scenario. In addition, the buffer was sized so that each BHC will have a cushion above regulatory minimums even in the stress scenario. Thus, any need for additional capital and/or a change in composition of capital to meet the SCAP buffer is not indicative of inadequate current capitalization. Instead, the SCAP buffer builds in extra capital against the unlikely prospect that the adverse scenario materializes. The presence of this one-time buffer will give market participants, as well as the firms themselves, confidence in the capacity of the major BHCs to perform their critical role in lending, even if the economy proves weaker than expected. Once this upfront buffer is established, the normal supervisory process will continue to be used to determine whether a firm’s current capital ratios are consistent with regulatory guidance. The SCAP and the Capital Planning Process Over the next 30 days, any BHC needing to augment its capital buffer will develop a detailed capital plan to be approved by its primary supervisor, in consultation with the FDIC, and willhave six months to implement that plan. In light of thepotential for new commitments under the Capital Assistance Program or exchanges of existing CPP preferred stock, supervisors will consult with Treasury on the development and evaluation of the plans. The capital plan will consist of three main elements: • A detailed description of the specific actions to be taken to increase the level of capital and/or to enhance the quality of capital consistent with establishing the SCAP buffer. BHCs are encouraged to design capital plans that, wherever possible, actively seek to raise new capital from private sources. These plans should include actions such as: > Issuance of new private capital instruments; > Restructuring current capital instruments; > Sales of business lines, legal entities, assets or minority interests through private transactions and through sales to the PPIP; > Use of joint ventures, spin-offs, or other capital enhancing transactions; and > Conservation of internal capital generation, including continued restrictions on dividends and stock repurchases and dividend deferrals, waivers and suspensions on preferred securities including trust preferred securities, with the expectation that plans should not rely on near-term potential increases in revenues to meet the capital buffer it is expected to have. • A list of steps to address weaknesses, where appropriate, in the BHC’s internal processes for assessing capital needs and engaging in effective capital planning.• An outline of the steps the firm will take over time to repay government provided capital taken under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), Targeted Investment Program (TIP), or the CAP, and reduce reliance on guaranteed debt issued under the TLGP. In addition, as part of the 30-day planning process, firms will need to review their existing management and Board in order to assure that the leadership of the firm has sufficient expertise and ability to manage the risks presented by the current economic environment and maintain balance sheet capacity sufficient to continue prudent lending to meet the credit needs of the economy. Supervisors expect that the board of directors and the senior management of each BHC will give the design and implementation of the capital plan their full and immediate attention and strong support. Capital plans will be submitted and approved bysupervisors by June 8th, 2009. Upon approval, these capitalplans will be the basis for the BHC’s establishment of the SCAP capital buffer by November 9th, 2009. Mandatory Convertible Preferred under the CAP To ensure that the banking system has the capital it needs to provide the credit necessary to support economic growth, the Treasury is making capital available under its Capital Assistance Program as a bridge to private capital in the future.A BHC may apply for Mandatory Convertible Preferred (MCP) in an amount up to 2% of risk-weighted assets (or higher upon request). MCP can serve as a source of contingent common capital for the firm, convertible into common equity when and if needed to meet supervisory expectations regarding the amount andcomposition of capital. Treasury will consider requests toexchange outstanding preferred shares sold under the CPP or the Targeted Investment Program (TIP) for new mandatory convertiblepreferred issued under the CAP. In order to protect thetaxpayer interest, the Treasury expects that any exchange of Treasury-issued preferred stock for MCP will be accompanied or preceded by new capital raises or exchanges of private capital securities into common equity. The MCP instrument is designed to give banks the incentive to redeem or replace the government-provided capital with private capital when feasible. The term sheet for MCP is available at www.financialstability.gov. The SCAP focused on the largest financial firms to ensure that they maintain adequate capital buffers to withstand losses in an adverse economic environment. Smaller financial institutions generally maintain capital levels, especially common equity, well above regulatory capital standards. There is no intention to expand the SCAP beyond the 19 BHCs that have recently completed this exercise. The Treasury reiterates that the CAP application process remains open to these institutions under the same terms and conditions applicable to the 19 SCAP BHCs. The Treasury stands ready to review and process any applications received in an expedient manner. For those firms wishing to apply to CAP, supervisors will review those firms’ risk profiles and capital positions.In addition, supervisors will evaluate the firms’ internal capital assessment processes, including capital planning efforts that incorporate the potential impact of stressful market conditions and adverse economic outcomes. Redeeming Preferred Securities Issued under the CPP Supervisors will carefully weigh an institution’s desire to redeem outstanding CPP preferred stock against the contribution of Treasury capital to the institutions overall soundness, capital adequacy, and ability to lend, including confirming that BHCs have a comprehensive internal capital assessment process.All BHCs seeking to repay CPP will be subject to the existing supervisory procedures for approving redemption requests for capital instruments. The 19 BHCs that were subject to the SCAP process must have a post-repayment capital base at least consistent with the SCAP buffer, and must be able to demonstrate its financial strength by issuing senior unsecured debt for a term greater than five years not backed by FDIC guarantees, in amounts sufficient to demonstrate a capacity to meet funding needs independent of government guarantees.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Back In The USSR

I have received many calls and e-mails asking my opinion as to whether or not investors should participate in General Motors' offer to exchange their bonds for GM common at a ratio of 225 shares per bond. Investors considering this exchange are making two mistakes.


Mistake #1: Investors are assuming that GM common shares will be worth about what they are trading at now ($1.85 or about 41 cents on the dollar per bond). Share dilution could push GM share prices lower. The fact that, if the exchange is successful and the UAW and government combine to own approximately 90% of GM when this is over means that shareholder value and growth will not be job #1.

Mistake #2: A major mistake investors are making is believing that the exchange will occur. For a successful exchange to occur and for bankruptcy to be averted under the government's, I mean under GM's plan, 90% of bondholders have to approve of the deal. I have as much chance of passing through the sun unscathed as 90% of GM bondholders accepting a deal to give up their status as senior creditors and become equity holders in an enterprise run for the benefit of the UAW and the green lobby.

The government is already taking steps to take advantage of this. The Obama administration is poised to push ahead with its so-called "Cash for Clunkers" plan. Consumers could receive rebates of up to $4,500 to trade in their current older vehicles for new "green" vehicles produced by (drum roll please) the new GM and Chrysler. Those who think that this is a good idea should consider two things. First, where do worn out batteries used in hybrids go when they where out? Usually to land fills where their lead is absorbed into the soil. Secondly, the last time government tried to help run an auto industry and preserve union jobs was the British Leyland fiasco in the 1970s. How many 2009 Triumphs are on the road these days?

The government presented the final stress test results to the "Big 19" banks today. Information (selectively chosen) will be released to the public this Thursday. During my travels last week, many financial advisers where optimistic that the results would be positive. Boys and girls, if they were positive, Tim Geithner would have been doing his Paul Revere impersonation "ready to ride and spread the alarm through every Middlesex village and farm" (apologies to Longfellow). If the information released is surprisingly positive, the market will not believe it too be factual for the market knows that something is rotten in the state of Denmark (apologies to Shakespeare). If the news is unexpectedly dire, the market will punish certain banks.

The government set guidelines for banks to pay back TARP funds. The most critical requirement is for banks to raise capital outside the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. Thus far, JPM, GS, and Northern Trust have done so. Two large, troubled banks have not. One, in fact, issued $7 billion of TLGP bonds last week. Don't worry, the government is all to happy to have certain large banks in its back pocket. This will enable the government to use these banks to promote its social agenda (low income lending, mortgage forgiveness, etc.) Welcome to Amerika.

All is not lost in the capital markets, however. There are signs of life in the economy (the so-called green shoots). Although opportunities abound in the high grade corporate bond market for investors who can tolerate volatility, one must take the possible bottoming of the economy for what it is, a settling at the bottom of a deep ocean. The recovery is unlikely to be V shaped, but rather more like a U with the right side being severely elongated. The worst may be over, but a boom is unlikely this year. Beware cheerleader-driven asset bubbles.

Friday, May 1, 2009

Der Kommisar

If anyone still thinks that the Obama administration has any intention of rescuing companies and returning them to profitable, capitalist enterprises please stop drinking the Kool-Aid. It was bad enough that the government is using its influence on TARP-receiving banks to forward its agenda, now the administration is going to restructure the automakers, GM and Chrysler, to provide jobs to the UAW. The UAW's money to help buy the presidency was well spent as the administration is going out of its way to ensure that either the UAW or itself own majorities of both GM and Chrysler, ignoring the rights of creditors and, in the case of GM, a plan to make taxpayers whole.

Yesterday, Chrysler filed for Chapter XI protection after some of its creditors (nearly everyone which was not a TARP bank), declined to accept the governments plan which would have left them as minority equity owners in a company run by and for the benefit if the UAW. What is more outrageous is that President Obama heavily criticized (ripped) Chrysler's who were well within their rights to demand a larger portion of ownership in Chrysler.

GM is an even more outrageous situation. GM creditors are owed $27 billion. The government is owed $15.4 billion. Given this, it would be foolish, not to mention unfair, for GM creditors (who in a bankruptcy court have a senior claim and majority on owning GM) to accept the government's plan which would give GM creditors a 10% equity ownership in a company in which the UAW and the government would collectively own nearly 90%. That would be just plain foolish.

GM bondholders have offered a counter proposal. GM creditors want control over 58% of GM and give the UAW ownership in 40% (the remaining 2% would go to other outside investors). GM creditors also said that GM would be able to pay the government (taxpayer) loans back in full. The Obama administration declined the offer.

Many analysts and market pundits are of the opinion that creditors are trying for more cents in the dollar for compensation. What is really happening here is that GM creditors do not want to be owners in a company which will be run as a non-profit organization. Come on, how profitable can GM be with the government and the UAW running it as a workers collective? How appropriate for May Day. Not only would I not invest in GM, I would not do so with the money of my worst enemy.

This socialistic power grab could be beneficial to GMAC bondholders. The government has selected GMAC as the financier of choice for both GM and Chrysler. Being a TARP bank means that GMAC will make good on its debts, as long as GM and Chrysler are building vehicles and Obama or his ilk are in power. Welcome to the People's Republic of America. If the government and / or the UAW end up as majority owners in GM and Ford, I will not purchase a vehicle from either company as long as the situation persists. I encourage my readers to do the same.

Monday, April 27, 2009

The Joker

Some people call me the space cowboy, yeah
Some call me the gangster of love ~ Steve Miller

GM announced its equity for debt swap and it is a joke. As per GM's S-4 filing, GM Bondholders would receive approximately 45 cents on the dollar, all in common equity. Although this may appear generous to those who were fearing news reports of 10 to 20 cents on the dollar could be reality, but if it appears that these terms are generous, the joke is on you.


Although 45 cents may appear relatively attractive, agreeing to such an exchange would leave bondholders in a bad situation. As the result of such an exchange bondholders would own 10 percent of GM. However, the UAW owns 30 percent and its government masters (or enablers) would own 50 percent. Gee, in whose interest do you think GM would be run?

Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich made it very clear in Saturday's Wall Street Journal when he stated:

"Suppose we tell General Motors Corp. -- now partly ours -- to shift its fleet to more fuel-efficient cars. Yet its executives know that as long as gas prices are low, Americans remain infatuated with highly profitable SUVs and pickup trucks? GM executives would have a perfect right, if not a duty, to disregard what we as citizens tell them to do in favor of what shareholders want them to do."

So let's get this straight. The government will exercise its authority as controlling shareholder to do what "citizens" want, not what the other shareholders want? The other shareholders want to build cares that consumers (citizens) will buy. Mr. Reich appears to be confused. He is far from confused. His "citizens" are not traditional automobile buyers, but the green lobby and other liberal groups. Trust me, if comsumers demand hybrids, electric cars or micro-cars, Detroit will build them, unless they would be unprofitable given their labor agreements. Here comes the punchline to this very bad joke.

A government-run GM would be run like a government program. It would provide jobs and build vehicles its political masters, not consumers demand. Any revenue shortfalls would be picked up by the government through tax dollars. Think of this as another WPA. Cars will be built purely to provide jobs. The types of vehicles will be chosen to appease liberal political supporters. Why would bondholders agree to this?

The simple answer is they won't. Bloomberg News is reporting that an ad hoc group of GM bondholders (the steering committee) is calling the proposal "unreasonable". Shelly Lombard, an analyst an Gimme Credit believes that bondholders could do worse in bankruptcy court. It is not certain that bondholders would receive any more in the way of numeric compensation, but bankruptcy could have some advantages for bondholders.

First, the bondholders would have a realistic chance of restructuring UAW agreements to reflect some semblance of reality. Secondly, the may receive compensation other than common equity. Maybe bondholders would receive new debt as partial compensation giving them a higher claim than the UAW or he government. Thirdly, by forcing GM into bankruptcy, shares issued to creditors would be new shares as existing shareholders (including the UAW and government) wiped out. This last point is the real reason the government and UAW want to avoid bankruptcy. Sorry Shelly ol' gal, That last point was an easy one.

Look for the bondholders to push for a bankruptcy and for Steve Rattner and Ron Gettelfinger to soil their undergarments.

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

On The Road Again

I was on the road today so I am not in my usual form. However, I need to discuss Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley reported disappointed earning versus analyst estimates. Reasons for the disappointing earnings were reduced leverage and risk taking by the Firm's fixed income traders and the marking up of Morgan Stanley bond values.

The current financial crisis was caused by poor (or derelict) risk management. However, most firms (JPM, GS and BAC) did not abandon the fixed income trading arena. According to the earnings report, Morgan Stanley reduced its leverage to 11 time. Has Morgan Stanley gone too far? Possibly, especially considering that it is a BINO (bank in name only) and does not have the diverse income sources of the larger financial institutions. Historically, investment banks have taken more leverage than money center banks. However, Morgan Stanley is a TARP institution and management may have felt that it should not take in too much risk. How much risk and leverage is enough? That is something which will be debated for years to come. I think it is safe to say that we will not see Bear and Lehman levels of 25 to 30 times anytime soon..

Another reason for Morgan's disappointing earnings was that it had to mark its debt up. One would think that one's bonds trading at higher prices would be a good thing. After all, higher prices equal lower yields and therefore, lower borrowing costs. However, there is accounting trickery afoot. As demonstrated by another large bank which reported earnings last week, how one marks one's bonds can lead to profits or losses.

Last week, a large bank which doesn't sleep recorded unrealized profits by marking down (accurately) the value of its outstanding bonds. The accounting theory is that as company can retire its debt below par by purchasing its bonds in the open market. The problem is that when a company's bonds trade at a deep discount it is because its in poor financial condition and not able to retire debt. Morgan Stanley was on the other side of this coin. Last quarter, MS took advantage of accounting rules and marked down the value of its bonds, but as spreads tightened and treasury benchmarks remained low, MS was forced to mark its bond prices higher, giving up unrealized profits. Live by clever accounting, die by clever accounting.


Late in the day, GM announced that it will not be paying of $1 billion of bonds coming due on 6/1/09. Instead it is hoping to cut a deal with creditors which will allow the company to give investors cents on the dollar in the form of equity shares. It will be interesting to see how creditors react to what amounts to a technical default. If bondholders do not agree to a deal with GM, they could force an involuntary bankruptcy. Stay tuned.

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Strange Days Indeed

Nobody told me there'd be days like these
Nobody told me there'd be days like these
Nobody told me there'd be days like these
Strange days indeed -- strange days indeed ~ John Lennon


The Fed came in and bought $7 billion worth of U.S. treasuries causing prices of U.S. treasuries to decline. You can stop re-reading or rubbing your eyes. What I have just written is not a mistake. In the markets perception is everything. In this case, government bond traders were betting that the Fed would be more aggressive. True to its word, the Fed stayed within the 7-10 year range of the yield curve. This caused a healthy selloff of nearly a point. Rates on the long end of the curve could be stuck around current levels for a while as the countervailing forces of Fed purchases (it has bought on the long end before) and copious amounts of government debt issuance and dollar printing exert their effects. I still like JPM, GS, USB, PNC and GE Cap bonds as far out as 10-years. Eventual credit spread tightening could (should) make up for much of the effects of higher treasury benchmark yields.

President Obama's Automotive Task Force has decided to meet with GM bondholders. Thus far, GM bondholders have been excluded from government / GM discussions. This is a good idea if the Obama administration seeks to avoid a GM trip to bankruptcy court. However, this is just what bondholders may want.

Last week, GM announced that it will make an all equity settlement offer to GM bondholders. Speculation on the Street puts the compensation level at between 10 and 20 cents on the dollar. GM bondholders were not happy. A group of GM bondholders (who have become the defacto negotiators) had suggested a settlement of 33 cents on the dollar consisting of stock, bonds and cash. GM is insisting on all stock. Bondholders may be crazy, but they are not dumb. They know that owning stock in a suspect GM with a recalcitrant UAW is not an optimal situation. They also know that they would be in the best position of all parties in terms of compensation. The Obama Administration knows that the UAW would be at a severe disadvantage and the Administration doesn't want that. GM bondholders who want all cash should probably sell here. Those who want a chance at a higher return, but are not as concerned with how they are compensated, may want to hold and see how it all plays out.

Investors should note that GMAC bonds and bondholders are not involved with this process. GMAC has (and has always had) a separate capital structure. GMAC is not part of these negotiations. The government is very much incentivized to keep GMAC functioning (out of bankruptcy) if GM is to survive.


Here are the facts:

GMAC is a TARP bank holding company.

GMAC has (with government approval) the ability to issue TLGP bonds guaranteed by the FDIC.

GMAC is responsible for most (upwards of 90% by some accounts) of dealer inventory financing. No dealers = no GM = no UAW.

Although I cannot guarantee it (especially with the UAW involved with GM), GMAC bonds should be ok in the near future (2009 and maybe 2010). After that it is anyone's guess as GM's survival may not be so politically important in the future.

Citi conducted its annual shareholder meeting. Many investors vented their frustrations. Management was somewhat more humble, but the dysfunction continues.

The DJIA rallied after Tim (my story is ever-changing) Geithner stated that the "vast majority" of U.S. banks are well-capitalized. He is probably accurate when small local banks are included. However, some larger banks are only well capitalized because of government programs. Others (some quite large) are probably not well capitalized even with government liquidity programs. Thus far the government's TALF and PPIP plans have not been able to attract private investors, although retail brokers continue to call my place of employment stating that they have clients ready to invest. These investors should look around and see what institutions are investing along side them. They will discover that TALF and PPIP are lonely places.

Meanwhile bank CDS continues to trade at wide levels. The more suspect the bank, the wider the CDS spread. The bank vigilantes want to know the extent of the toxic assets on bank balance sheets and the want to know the damage and when they will be removed from bank balance sheets before the invest their capital in most, if not all banks. Oh yeah, whatever happened to the expected benefits of the change to mark to market accounting?


Until next time, stay safe in the markets. Not much makes sense these days.